SM2 algorithm signature method applied to CS architecture

Abstract

The invention discloses a SM2 algorithm signature method applied to CS architecture. The method comprises the following steps: 1) a client generates a sub private key D1, a server generates a sub private key D2; 2) the client generates message abstract e of a to-be-signed message M, generates a signature request as shown in description, and sends the e' to a server, and b is the password set by the client when registering to the server; 3) the server extracts the password b from e' and verifies whether the password b is correct, and ends the signature if the password b is error, and feeds backconfirm information to the client if the password b is correct; the client generates a first part signature Q1 and sends the same to the server; 4) the server generates the second part signature r according to the Q1 and the message abstract e, and generates the third part signature s2 and the fourth signature s3 according to D2, and sends the r, s2 and s3 to the client; and 5) the client generates the signature of the message M according to D1, r, s2 and s3. The security of the signature algorithm is improved.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention relates to the field of encryption, in particular to an SM2 algorithm signature method applied to a CS framework. Background technique [0002] At present, digital signature and encryption and decryption technologies based on public key cryptography have been widely used in e-commerce, identity authentication and other applications, and have become an important tool to ensure information security, and the security of private keys is the basis for ensuring the security of these applications. [0003] In order to improve the security of the private key, the threshold cryptography algorithm splits the private key and distributes it in different physical devices to avoid direct storage and use of all private key information. For example, in a (c, n) threshold signature scheme, the private key can be distributed among n members, among which t or more members can cooperate to complete the signature, but less than t members cannot complete the s...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

The reason for this risk is that when the SM2 private key is synthesized each time, there is no mechanism for the server to actively verify the identity of the client entity, but blindly believe that the holder of the original client sub-private key is the legitimate user

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