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An abnormal state checking method and a terminal

An abnormal state and terminal technology, applied in the field of security verification, can solve problems such as the impossibility of passing the chain of trust step by step, and achieve the effect of improving security and credibility

Inactive Publication Date: 2019-06-28
BEIJING KEXIN HUATAI INFORMATION TECH
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  • Summary
  • Abstract
  • Description
  • Claims
  • Application Information

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

A few secure TF cards for industry users have password functions and can support commercial secret algorithms. They can be regarded as a smart card security chip in the form of an SD interface. Since there is no independent design of the Trusted Condition Register (TCR, Trusted Condition Register) It is still not possible to pass the trust chain step by step during the device startup process

Method used

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  • An abnormal state checking method and a terminal
  • An abnormal state checking method and a terminal
  • An abnormal state checking method and a terminal

Examples

Experimental program
Comparison scheme
Effect test

Embodiment 1

[0031] This embodiment provides a safety verification method, setting the first TCR in the chip of the safety device, please refer to Figure 1-2 , the security verification method, comprising the following steps:

[0032] Step 1: The device is powered on and started, and the first hash value is calculated according to the core code chip firmware of the device, and the initial hash value stored in the first TCR is calculated to obtain the second hash value, and the A second hash value is written into the first TCR to cover the initial hash value.

[0033] Specifically, after the device is started, the central processing unit invokes the cryptographic chip to perform a hash operation on the core code chip firmware to obtain the first hash value, and then converts the initial value in the first TCR to the core code chip firmware through the TCR extension interface. The firmware performs hash operation to obtain the first hash value and performs hash operation together to obtain...

Embodiment 2

[0047] This embodiment provides another security verification method, setting the first TCR, the second TCR, the third TCR and the fourth TCR in the chip of the security device, please refer to Figure 3-4 , the security verification method, comprising the following steps:

[0048] Step 1: The device is powered on and started, and the first hash value is calculated according to the core code chip firmware of the device, and the initial hash value stored in the first TCR is calculated to obtain the second hash value, and the A second hash value is written into the first TCR to cover the initial hash value, and the first hash value is stored in the second TCR.

[0049] Specifically, after the device is started, the central processing unit invokes the cryptographic chip to perform a hash operation on the core code chip firmware to obtain the first hash value, and then converts the initial value in the first TCR to the core code chip firmware through the TCR extension interface. ...

Embodiment 3

[0066] This embodiment provides another security verification method, setting the first TCR, the second TCR and the third TCR in the chip of the security device, please refer to Figure 5-6 , the security verification method, comprising the following steps:

[0067] Step 1: The device is powered on and started, and the first hash value is calculated according to the core code chip firmware of the device, and the first hash value is written into the first TCR.

[0068] Specifically, after the device is started, the central processing unit invokes the cryptographic chip to perform a hash operation on the core code chip firmware to obtain the first hash value, and then uses the TCR extension interface to perform hash operation on the core code chip firmware to obtain the first hash value. A hash value is stored in the first TCR.

[0069] Specifically, the MD5 algorithm is used to perform the above hash value calculation.

[0070] Step 2: Calculate a second hash value according ...

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PUM

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Abstract

The invention discloses an abnormal state checking method. The method comprises the steps that a verifier receives a credential file sent by equipment, andauthenticates its integrity, then, the legality of the credential file is confirmed; If it is determined that the device is untrusted, the verifier compares and verifies the first hash value, the second hash value and the third hash value whichare received in advance with a pre-stored reference value; By means of the technical scheme, step-by-step transmission of the trust chain in the equipment starting process can be achieved, the abnormal position and stage can be accurately and timely positioned, and the safety and reliability of the safety equipment are greatly improved.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention relates to the field of security verification, in particular to a method for checking an abnormal state and a terminal. Background technique [0002] Ukey (USB KEY) has a built-in smart card chip and has a certain storage space, which can store the user's private key and digital certificate, and use the built-in public key algorithm of Ukey to realize the authentication of the user's identity. Since the user's private key is stored in the password chip, it is difficult to crack in theory, so the security of user authentication can be guaranteed. The current hacking technology is changing with each passing day, and it is difficult to crack does not mean that it cannot be cracked. [0003] At present, the common TF card (Trans-flash Card) on the market only has the storage function and does not support cryptographic algorithms. The selling point of the common TF card lies in its capacity and storage speed. A few secure TF cards for indust...

Claims

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Application Information

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IPC IPC(8): G06F21/44G06F21/78H04L9/32
Inventor 田健生王昱波杨秩
Owner BEIJING KEXIN HUATAI INFORMATION TECH
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