An imsi/supi physical layer key protection method without channel estimation

Abstract

The invention discloses an IMSI / SUPI physical layer key protection method without channel estimation. The base station analyzes its received signal at the physical layer, and multiplies it by the corresponding sent signal of the random access response to obtain the received signal processed by the base station; The mobile terminal analyzes its own received signal at the physical layer, and multiplies the transmitted signal corresponding to the random access request to obtain the received signal processed by the mobile terminal; the base station samples the received signal processed by the base station, obtains the sampled value, and extracts the sampled signal Quantize the amplitude and phase of the value to generate the initial key bits; the mobile terminal samples the received signal processed by the mobile terminal, obtains the sampled value, and extracts the amplitude and phase quantization of the sampled value to generate the initial key bit. The present invention can prevent the IMSI of the 4G system and the SUPI of the 5G system from being leaked to the attacker through plaintext transmission, resist signal injection and channel manipulation attacks aimed at physical layer key generation, and reduce computational complexity.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention belongs to the technical field of security protection of mobile communication systems, and in particular relates to an IMSI / SUPI physical layer key protection method without channel estimation. Background technique [0002] With the advent of the 5G era, 5G mobile communication systems have put forward higher requirements for security. Aiming at the privacy leakage problem caused by IMSI plaintext transmission in the 4G era, 5G named the mobile user identity as SUPI, and the 5G security standard document 3GPP TS 33.501 first decided to use the public key encryption scheme (ECIES) based on the elliptic curve algorithm as the initial registration process. SUPI protection mechanism: The mobile terminal and the base station use the elliptic curve algorithm to calculate a public key and a private key respectively. The mobile terminal uses the public key to encrypt SUPI into SUCI for transmission. After receiving the SUCI, the base station uses...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

However, the channel estimation algorithm based on the mutual transmission of public pilots by legal parties involves a large number of matrix operations, which makes traditional physical layer key generation also require large overhead in practical applications; and in 2019 IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing The published Manipulative Attack against Physical Layer Key Agreement and Countermeasure[J] points out that the openness of the pilot makes the physical layer key generation scheme based on channel estimation vulnerable to signal injection and channel manipulation attacks, allowing attackers to steal legitimate communications Physical layer keys generated by both parties

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