Vehicle intranet communication security authentication method and device

Abstract

The present invention provides a method and device for security authentication of in-vehicle network communication. The method includes two parts: authentication of each in-vehicle component to the gateway and authentication of each in-vehicle component by the gateway. The first key and the second key are encrypted by generating random numbers at both ends of the vehicle-mounted component and the gateway respectively, and decrypted by the other party to complete the response authentication. The method performs bidirectional identity authentication based on the in-vehicle network by the gateway and the vehicle-mounted component ECU at the initial stage of vehicle startup to verify the legitimacy of the identities of both parties, and can effectively resist replay and forgery attacks. In each authentication process, a new random number is generated for two-way authentication, so that each authentication is random and will not be affected by replay attacks. At the same time, the first key and the second key are pre-recorded on the vehicle component segment and the gateway respectively, which can effectively resist external forgery attacks.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention relates to the technical field of in-vehicle network communication, in particular to a method and device for safety authentication of in-vehicle network communication. Background technique [0002] In vehicle intranet security communication, the legitimacy of identities of on-board components ECU (Electronic Control Unit, electronic control unit) and gateway is the premise and guarantee of secure communication. The lack of an effective authentication mechanism between the in-vehicle components and the gateway makes it vulnerable to forgery attacks and replay attacks. [0003] With the further high-speed and intelligent development of the Internet of Vehicles, the security risks faced by intelligent connected vehicles are increasing. In order to improve the security of the in-vehicle network, the SecOC (Security Onboard Communication) security verification mechanism is the in-vehicle CAN (Controller Area Communication) security verificatio...

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Problems solved by technology

[0004] However, since the fresh value synchronization occurs at the start-up stage of the car, the fresh value mechanism in SecOC has not yet taken effect at this time, so after the attacker collects all the fresh value synchronization messages in the fresh value period, replay attacks and forged attacks can be realized, resulting in The subsequent SecOC security communication fails, so that the vehicle cannot drive normally or has an accident during driving due to incorrect synchronization of the freshness value

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