Clock period randomization for defense against cryptographic attacks

Abstract

Methods, systems, and apparatuses for defending against cryptographic attacks using clock period randomization. The methods, systems, and apparatuses are designed to make side channel attacks and fault injection attacks more difficult by using a clock with a variable period during a cryptographic operation. In an example embodiment, a clock period randomizer includes a fixed delay generator and avariable delay generator, wherein a variable delay generated by the variable delay generator is based on a random or pseudorandom value that is changed occasionally or periodically. The methods, systems, and apparatuses are useful in hardware security applications where fault injection and / or side channel attacks are of concern.

Description

[0001] Cross References to Related Applications [0002] This application claims priority to US Provisional Patent Application No. 62 / 298,842, filed February 23, 2016, the entire disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference. Background technique [0003] Many computing systems use cryptography to enable secure communications between entities. Modern encryption systems often rely on keys, some of which must be kept secret from the outside world in order to maintain security. Numerous methods have been proposed and implemented to extract these keys surreptitiously. [0004] Two categories of encryption attacks are side channel attacks and fault injection attacks. In a side-channel attack, the attacker monitors the device executing the encryption algorithm. For example, during execution, a device's power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, and / or acoustic emissions may provide an attacker with information about the data processed and instructions executed, as th...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

[0006] If a cryptographic attack is able to extract the secret key from the device, it can compromise the security of the device

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