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42 results about "Fault injection attack" patented technology

Fault-injection attacks have been around as long as the Web itself. They allow malicious access into a network or computer system through a Web application. With the explosive growth of applications, and as more applications are migrated to the Web, injection attacks have become a growing concern.

Security property-driven vulnerability assessments of ICs against fault-injection attacks

Various embodiments provide methods, systems, computer program products, apparatuses, and / or the like for assessing vulnerability of an IC design to fault injection attacks, such as through a security property-driven vulnerability assessment framework for efficiently evaluating faults with respect to certain security properties associated with the IC design. In one embodiment, a method is provided. The method includes generating, using a fault-injection technique specification, one or more fault models describing attributes of one or more faults. The method further includes selecting, using the fault models and executable security properties associated with a design file of an IC design, a fault list identifying a plurality of possible faults for the IC design. The method further includes identifying, based at least in part on performing a fault simulation on the design file with the fault list, critical locations of the IC design. The method further includes implementing protections at the critical locations.
Owner:UNIV OF FLORIDA RESEARCH FOUNDATION INC

Method for resisting fault injection attacks in secure boot

A method for resisting fault injection attacks during secure boot is provided. The method may include: performing a secure check on a System-on-Chip (SoC), wherein one or more pre-determined values are written on one or more bits of a first register of the SoC during the secure check; reading one or more corresponding bits of a second register of the SoC; and comparing the values of the one or more bits of the second register with the values of the one or more corresponding bits of the first register. In response to a comparison result that the values of the one or more bits of the second register are the same as the values of the one or more corresponding bits of the first register, the SoC is booted.
Owner:BEKEN CORP

Fault-to-time converter sensor for low-overhead fault injection attack mitigation

Various embodiments of the present disclosure provide fault injection attack mitigation for an integrated circuit. In one example, an embodiment provides for providing a sampling clock signal to both high voltage threshold (HVT) cells and low voltage threshold (LVT) cells of a fault-to-time converter sensor of an integrated circuit, providing output of the HVT cells and the LVT cells to an encoder stage of the fault-to-time converter sensor, and detecting one or more fault injection attacks with respect to the integrated circuit based on output of the encoder stage.
Owner:UNIV OF FLORIDA RESEARCH FOUNDATION INC

System for detecting fault injection attacks

An integrated circuit (IC) that includes an always-on buffer and a power line is provided. The power line is routed on the IC such that a first end of the power line is at a first global supply voltage and a second end of the power line is at a second global supply voltage that is less than the first global supply voltage. The always-on buffer receives an input bit and the second global supply voltage and generates an output bit that has a same logic state as that of the input bit. During a fault injection attack, the second global supply voltage is altered such that the logic state of the output bit toggles while the logic state of the input bit remains same. Based on the toggling of the logic state of the output bit, the fault injection attack on the IC is detected.
Owner:NXP BV

Integrated fault injection emulators for testing integrated circuit countermeasures

An integrated circuit formed with interconnected electronic elements includes at least:i) functional elements which perform IC operations;ii) at least one countermeasure (CM) for detecting fault injection attacks upon the IC and outputting an alert signal when a FI attack is detected; andiii) at least one attack emulator which emulates FI attacks on the IC by applying stimuli to the plurality of functional elements in accordance with at least one control signal.The IC may include other elements such as power supply elements, oscillators, interface elements and so forth.
Owner:NUVOTON

Fault injection attack method and device for signature algorithm

The invention relates to the field of information security, in particular to a fault injection attack method and device for a signature algorithm. The method comprises the following steps: introducing a single-bit fault on an X coordinate of a private key; obtaining a correct signature result and a fault signature result of the target user; and comparing and analyzing the correct signature result and the wrong signature result, and calculating a complete private key. According to the method, a single-bit fault is introduced to the X coordinate of the private key, and the private key is effectively recovered by combining the comparative analysis of the correct signature result and the wrong signature result. The method is simple to operate, low in computing resource demand and high in practicability and operability, and provides a new view angle for design and security evaluation of the cryptographic chip. According to the method, a single-bit fault is introduced into the private key, and the private key can be effectively recovered at relatively low calculation cost by utilizing a known correct signature result and a known wrong signature result.
Owner:SHENZHEN INST OF ADVANCED TECH CHINESE ACAD OF SCI +1

Security system

The present invention provides a security system configured on a chip to be protected, the system including fault injection detection subsystems configured on the chip, each fault injection detection subsystem having a plurality of real-time selectable sensitivity levels and including at least one hardware fault injection detector circuit disposed on the chip and / or sensitivity level control logic coupled with the hardware fault injection detector circuit, deployable on the chip and operable in real-time to transition the fault injection detection subsystem from a current sensitivity level of the plurality of selectable sensitivity levels to a next sensitivity level of the plurality of selectable sensitivity levels, for example by generating a sensitivity control signal (also referred to as a sensitivity level selection) and / or sending the sensitivity control signal to at least one hardware fault injection detector circuit in the fault injection detection subsystem. The fault injection countermeasure circuit is operated to protect the processor from fault injection attacks dynamically depending on the execution flow of the processor core.
Owner:NUVOTON

Circuit and method for detecting a fault injection attack in an integrated circuit

A fault detection circuit includes a plurality of conductors, a plurality of logic gates coupled to the conductors, a storage circuit, and a checker circuit. The conductors are arranged in parallel. Each logic gate is coupled to a first end of each conductor. The storage circuit is coupled to a second end of each conductor. The checker circuit is coupled to the storage circuit. A known initial bit pattern is provided to an input of the logic gates, and an output of the logic gates is provided to the storage circuit via the conductors. The checker circuit determines if the output of the logic gates stored in the storage circuit is an expected result. If the output is not the expected result, then the checker circuit provides an indication that a fault injection attack is occurring. In another embodiment, a method for detecting a fault injection attack is provided.
Owner:NXP BV

System and methods for fault injection attack protection

Aspects of the present disclosure involve systems, methods, apparatus, and computer-readable media for mitigating laser-based fault injection attacks against one or more processing devices. Techniques may include generating a corresponding representation of at least one of data or a component of a processing device, locating the corresponding representation on a die of the processing device adjacent to a location on the die of at least one of the data or the component, and executing, based on a determination that the corresponding representation is different than at least one of the data or the component of the processing device, a mitigation procedure. One example may include hashing, using a secure hashing function, security data to generate integrity data corresponding to the security data and storing the security data and the integrity data in adjacent memory locations in a memory device.
Owner:SDG LOGIC INC

Asynchronous code execution for improved performance and security measures to protect digital security devices

Performance is improved while protecting the computerized digital security device against side channel attacks, fault injection attacks, and timing attacks, the method including executing a first application including identifying asynchronous tasks to be executed by the computerized digital security device by placing the identified asynchronous tasks in an asynchronous task queue, and non-linearizing execution of the application by selecting at least one task from the asynchronous task queue, executing the selected at least one task, and removing the selected at least one task from the asynchronous task queue.
Owner:THALES DIS FRANCE SA

Anti-attack block cipher encryption method for multi-scene application

The application relates to an anti-attack block cipher encryption method for multi-scene application. A group of random numbers generated by a random number module is pre-stored in a register, two groups of round functions are designed to simultaneously encrypt plaintext, irrelevant data is encrypted by using an irrelevant key to interfere with the power consumption curve of the current chip when the plaintext is correctly encrypted, so that the power consumption curve obtained by an attacker contains irrelevant power consumption, the difficulty of power consumption curve analysis is increased, and a random pseudo round is inserted in the 10 rounds of normal operation to prevent a fault injection attack; when there is no attacker, the two groups of round functions are simultaneously used to simultaneously encrypt two groups of plaintext, and the encryption speed is improved.
Owner:NO 47 INST OF CHINA ELECTRONICS TECH GRP

Countermeasure against fault injection attacks

A method includes programming first and second values and a first compare enable command into respective first operand, second operand, and first compare enable command registers in a hardware comparator circuit. The method includes determining that a first match exists corresponding to the first and second values, programming a third value into the first operand register and a fourth value into the second operand register, and programming a second compare enable command into a second compare enable command register in the hardware comparator circuit. In response to a determination that a second match exists corresponding to the third and fourth values, the method includes asserting a success interrupt signal, programming a fifth value into the first operand register and a sixth value into the second operand register and programming a second compare enable command into a second compare enable command register in the hardware comparator circuit.
Owner:TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INC

System for detecting fault injection attacks

An integrated circuit (IC) that includes an always-on buffer and a power line is provided. The power line is routed on the IC such that a first end of the power line is at a first global supply voltage and a second end of the power line is at a second global supply voltage that is less than the first global supply voltage. The always-on buffer receives an input bit and the second global supply voltage and generates an output bit that has a same logic state as that of the input bit. During a fault injection attack, the second global supply voltage is altered such that the logic state of the output bit toggles while the logic state of the input bit remains same. Based on the toggling of the logic state of the output bit, the fault injection attack on the IC is detected.
Owner:NXP BV

Burr detector

The invention relates to voltage glitch detection in an integrated circuit for detecting fault injection attacks. Example embodiments include an integrated circuit (411), the integrated circuit (411) including: a hardware accelerator (412) including a computing module (4131, 4132) configured to perform a computing function; and a glitch detector (4161, 4162) comprising a delay function (4131, 4132) and a comparator (4191, 4192), the comparator (4191, 4192) being arranged to compare an output from the delay function (4131, 4132) to an expected result to provide an output for detecting glitch, wherein the delay function (4131, 4132) of the glitch detector (4161, 4162) is provided at least in part by the computing function of the computing module (4131, 4132) in the hardware accelerator (412).
Owner:NXP BV

Fault-resilient secure-by-design systems elements

This document describes apparatuses and techniques for fault-resilient secure-by-design systems elements. In aspects, a method is disclosed that includes operating a plurality of design elements in a computing system that are configured to operate with standard timing slack and at least one security-critical design element configured to operate with increased timing slack that is greater than the standard timing slack. The increased timing slack enables a security-guarantee operation to be successfully performed by the at least one security-critical design element before a fault injection attack directed at one or more of the plurality of design elements causes a fault in operation of one or more of the plurality of design elements that would have prevented the security-guarantee operation from being successfully completed if the at least one security-critical design element were configured to operate with standard timing slack.
Owner:GOOGLE LLC

Data processing method, apparatus, and program product

PendingCN123031287AAlgorithmAttack
The application provides a data processing method, device and program product. The data processing method comprises: obtaining a scalar and a first coordinate point; determining a second coordinate point based on a preset elliptic curve; determining a third coordinate point by performing one or more point multiplication operations on the second coordinate point; when the bit sequence of the scalar is 0, determining a fourth coordinate point based on the first coordinate point, the third coordinate point and a first operation, and updating the third coordinate point based on the fourth coordinate point; when the bit sequence of the scalar is a non-0 value, updating the third coordinate point based on the first coordinate point, the third coordinate point and a second operation; wherein the operation of the first operation and the second operation is the same; when the bit sequence of the scalar has not been traversed, performing a point multiplication operation on the updated third coordinate point; and when the bit sequence of the scalar is traversed, outputting the third coordinate point updated after the scalar is traversed. The application has the technical features of resisting side-channel attacks and fault injection attacks and improving chip data security.
Owner:CHINA RESOURCES MICROELECTRONICS HLDG LTD

An attack positioning method, device and system for a white-box block cipher algorithm and a storage medium

The application discloses an attack positioning method, device and system of a group white-box cryptographic algorithm and a storage medium, and relates to the technical field of information security. The method is used to at least solve the problem that in the process of a white-box cryptographic fault injection attack experiment, a key execution point of injected faults cannot be accurately identified and an accurate injection timing cannot be accurately determined, resulting in poor attack precision and low attack efficiency. The method comprises the following steps: collecting side channel waveforms generated in the execution process of the group white-box cryptographic algorithm in real time; analyzing the morphological characteristics of the side channel waveforms to determine a target round of attack; determining a target waveform region with a waveform difference degree less than a difference degree threshold from a preset reference waveform from the actual side channel waveforms generated in the target round; and determining an attack positioning point according to the target waveform region.
Owner:北京银联金卡科技有限公司

Protection of cryptographic substitution-permutation networks from fault injection attacks

Aspects of the present disclosure involve a method and a system to perform the method to obtain a cryptographic output of a plurality of rounds of a cipher, by performing a plurality of modified rounds of the cipher, each of the modified rounds computing an unmasking transform, an operation of a respective round of the cipher, and a masking transform, the unmasking transform being an inverse of the masking transform of a previous round of the cipher.
Owner:CRYPTOGRAPHY RESEARCH INC

Attack positioning method, device and system of grouping white-box cryptographic algorithm and storage medium

The invention discloses an attack positioning method, device and system for a grouped white-box cryptographic algorithm and a storage medium, relates to the technical field of information security, and aims to at least solve the problem that in a white-box cryptographic fault injection attack experiment process, key execution points and accurate injection opportunities of injection faults cannot be accurately recognized, and the fault injection efficiency is improved. And therefore, the problems of poor attack accuracy and low attack efficiency can be solved. The method comprises the following steps: acquiring a side channel waveform generated in an execution process of a grouping white-box cryptographic algorithm in real time; analyzing the morphological characteristics of the side channel waveform, and determining a target round of attack; determining a target waveform region in which the waveform difference between the target waveform region and a preset reference waveform is smaller than a difference threshold value from the actual side channel waveforms generated in the target round; and determining an attack positioning point according to the target waveform region.
Owner:北京银联金卡科技有限公司

Capability Testing Method and System for Fault Attack Based on Hamming Weight

The present invention relates to the technical field of device testing, and particularly to a method and system for testing the ability of fault attacks based on Hamming weight, including fault response classification, establishment of a fault leakage function, selection of an effective time attack window, and selection of voltage glitches for fault injection attacks; selection of an effective fault injection parameter interval, and injecting a large number of faults within the above time window; according to the response distribution of each slice within the time window, selecting any appropriate combination of fault parameters, and reducing the entropy of the unknown key of the target device by analyzing the fault information. The present invention grasps the essence of the fault based on the fault probability of Hamming weight, accurately establishes a leakage model, has low requirements for data, strong fault tolerance, greatly reduces the data volume compared with the existing model, has good practicability, and solves the problem that most of the existing leakage models have certain limitations and cannot simultaneously take into account the requirements for data, data volume, fault tolerance, and attack efficiency.
Owner:NAVAL UNIV OF ENG PLA

Fault injection attack countermeasures

The method includes programming (410) a first value and a second value and a first compare enable command into respective first operand, second operand, and first compare enable command registers in a hardware comparator circuit. The method includes determining (440, 450) that there is a first match corresponding to the first and second values, programming a third value into the first operand register, a fourth value into the second operand register, and programming a second compare enable command into a second compare enable command register in the hardware comparator circuit. In response to determining that there is a second match corresponding to the third and fourth values, the method includes asserting a success interrupt signal, programming (472) a fifth value into the first operand register, a sixth value into the second operand register, and programming the second compare enable command into the second compare enable command register in the hardware comparator circuit.
Owner:TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INC

Electronic device with fault injection attack detection

A fault detection circuit can detect setup time and / or hold time faults which can indicate a possible fault injection attack using flip-flop circuits which are powered by a supply voltage and receive a clock signal. A hold time violation can be identified by providing the clock signal to a data input of a D flip-flop or equivalent circuit, and the complement of the clock signal, with a predetermined delay to clock input of the flip-flop. The hold time violation is indicated when the inverted and delayed clock signal has a different voltage from the uninverted (and undelayed) clock signal. Setup time violations can be identified by connecting the inverted output of each of a pair of flip-flops to their respective data input terminals in a feedback arrangement. For one of the flip flops, the feedback loop includes a predetermined delay. A setup time fault is indicated when the output voltages of the two flip-flops are different from each other.
Owner:NXP BV

System and method for detecting fault injection attacks

A security system configured for deployment on a chip which is to be protected, the system comprising fault injection detection subsystem / s configured for deployment on the chip, each fault injection detection subsystem having plural sensitivity levels which are selectable in real time and comprising at least one hardware fault injection detector circuit / s, configured for deployment on the chip, and / or, coupled thereto, sensitivity level control logic which may be configured for deployment on the chip and which may be operative, in real time, to transition the fault injection detection subsystem, from its current sensitivity level from among said plural selectable sensitivity levels, to a next sensitivity level from among said plural selectable sensitivity levels, e.g. by generating sensitivity control signals (aka sensitivity level selections) and / or feeding the sensitivity control signals to at least one hardware fault injection detector in the subsystem.
Owner:NUVOTON

Detection of electromagnetic fault injection attacks on digital systems

Techniques are described for detecting an electromagnetic (“EM”) fault injection attack directed toward circuitry in a target digital system. In various embodiments, a first node may be coupled to first driving circuitry, and a second node may be coupled to second driving circuitry. The driving circuitry is implemented in a manner such that a logic state on the second node has greater sensitivity to an EM pulse than has a logic state on the first node. Comparison circuitry may be coupled to the first and to the second nodes to assert an attack detection output responsive to sensing a logic state on the second node that is unexpected relative to a logic state on the first node.
Owner:NVIDIA CORP

Chip software code anti-attack protection method, chip and electronic equipment

The invention relates to the technical field of chip software security, and discloses a chip software code anti-attack protection method, a chip and electronic device.The method comprises the steps that in the running process of a chip software code, when the chip software code is executed to the position of a burying point, a random delay duration is generated, and the burying point is arranged at a to-be-protected node in the chip software code; pausing a main process of the chip software code and continuing the random delay duration; and after the random delay duration expires, recovering the main process of executing the chip software code. Based on the above method, for two or more fault injection attacks, random delay at the burying point enables the starting time of the key protection step to be uncertain, an attacker cannot repeatedly match the attack point, and key inspection is difficult to skip; for side channel attacks, random delay makes information such as execution time, chip power consumption and the like irregular, and attackers cannot extract rule features to reversely deduce sensitive data, so that attack logic is fundamentally cracked, and the security defect of an existing anti-attack protection scheme is made up.
Owner:BEIJING TSINGTENG MICROSYSTEM CO LTD

Fault-to-time converter sensor for low-overhead fault injection attack mitigation

ActiveUS12675610B2ConvertersLow voltage
Various embodiments of the present disclosure provide fault injection attack mitigation for an integrated circuit. In one example, an embodiment provides for providing a sampling clock signal to both high voltage threshold (HVT) cells and low voltage threshold (LVT) cells of a fault-to-time converter sensor of an integrated circuit, providing output of the HVT cells and the LVT cells to an encoder stage of the fault-to-time converter sensor, and detecting one or more fault injection attacks with respect to the integrated circuit based on output of the encoder stage.
Owner:UNIV OF FLORIDA RESEARCH FOUNDATION INC

Cryptographic integrated circuit and method for detecting fault injection attacks on cryptographic devices

The present invention relates to countermeasures against fault injection attacks on cryptographic integrated circuits, and more specifically to laser fault injection attacks. The invention comprises generating bit sequences belonging to a set of allowed sequences and storing these sequences on a set of flip-flops. Afterwards, the sequences stored on the flip-flops are checked, and if they do not belong to the allowed sequences, then this is a sign that a fault injection attack has occurred and caused a bit flip in one of the flip-flops. An alarm signal is then generated.
Owner:SECURE IC

Method for protecting against fault attacks an execution of a generation of a crystals-dilithium signature

The invention relates to methods, and associated devices, for protecting the execution of the generation of a Crystals-Dilithium digital signature σ of a message M with a secret key sk against attacks exploiting invalid signatures content by fault attacks. In order to prevent an attacker bypassing by fault injection attacks tests on a second test vector (I) from obtaining invalid signatures as outputs of the signature generation algorithm, the invention modifies the norm check performed on the second test vector (I) in such a way that if this check is skipped, the candidate signature is rejected by the subsequent test performed on a fourth vector of polynomials h.
Owner:THALES DIS FRANCE SA

Electronic device with fault injection attack detection

The invention describes an electronic device (100) comprising: i) a detector (110) configured to monitor a power supply and / or clock cycle; and ii) an evaluation device (120) coupled to the detector (110) and configured to evaluate a monitoring result with respect to a timing violation caused by a fault injection (FI) attack.
Owner:NXP BV