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SM2 signature method for resisting attacks by using co-processor

A co-processor and anti-attack technology, applied in the field of information security, can solve the problems of vulnerability to side channel attacks such as DPA and leakage of sensitive data, and achieve the effect of improving security

Active Publication Date: 2018-05-15
FEITIAN TECHNOLOGIES
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  • Summary
  • Abstract
  • Description
  • Claims
  • Application Information

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

The most basic operation in the SM2 algorithm is the point multiplication operation. The point multiplication operation is composed of a point addition operation and a point multiplication operation. The time and energy consumed to perform a point addition operation and a point multiplication operation are different, which is very It is easy to leak sensitive data through side-channel attacks such as SPA, DPA, and FA; in addition, when SM2 operations involve sensitive data operations such as private keys, if sensitive data such as private keys is not protected, it is also easy to suffer from side-channels such as DPA attack

Method used

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Experimental program
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Embodiment 1

[0039] The first embodiment of the present invention provides an SM2 signature method that uses a coprocessor to resist attacks, including the following steps:

[0040] Step S1: The CPU generates a preprocessing result according to the basic user information obtained from reading the memory and the information to be signed obtained from reading the memory;

[0041] Further, in step S1 in this embodiment, the CPU generates a preprocessing result according to the basic user information obtained from reading the memory and the information to be signed obtained from reading the memory, specifically: the CPU generates a preprocessing result according to the basic user information obtained from reading the memory and The information to be signed obtained by reading the memory is spliced ​​to generate a preprocessing result.

[0042] Step S2: The CPU controls the coprocessor to generate a first random result according to the base point of the elliptic curve and the third random number gener...

Embodiment 2

[0073] The second embodiment of the present invention provides an SM2 signature method that uses a coprocessor to resist attacks, such as figure 1 As shown, including the following steps:

[0074] Step 201: The CPU performs a splicing operation based on the user's basic information obtained from reading the memory and the information to be signed obtained from reading the memory to generate the data to be hashed, and store the generated data to be hashed in the memory. The data is hashed to obtain the signature hash value, and the signature hash value is stored in the memory;

[0075] Specifically, in this embodiment, before step 201, the method further includes: hashing to obtain the user's basic information according to the user's identifiable identifier, the first constant, and the user's public key, and storing the user's basic information in the memory; Identification ID: Information that can identify the user's identity without ambiguity. The first constant is a part of the e...

Embodiment 3

[0193] The third embodiment of the present invention provides an SM2 signature device that uses a coprocessor to resist attacks, such as figure 2 As shown, it includes: a CPU, a coprocessor 306, a memory 307, and a random number generator 308;

[0194] The CPU includes a reading module 301, a control module 302, a generation module 303, a first judgment module 304, and an output module 305;

[0195] The memory 307 is used to store basic user information and information to be signed;

[0196] The reading module 301 is configured to read the memory 307 to obtain basic user information and information to be signed;

[0197] The generating module 303 is configured to generate a pre-processing result according to the basic user information obtained by the reading module 301 reading the memory 307 and the information to be signed obtained by the reading module 301 reading the memory 307;

[0198] Further, the generation module 303 in this embodiment is specifically configured to perform a s...

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Abstract

The invention discloses an SM2 signature method for resisting attacks by using a co-processor, and relates to the field of information security. The method comprises the following steps: a CPU controls the co-processor to generates a first random result according to a base point of an elliptic curve and a third random number generated by a random number generator, and generating a third result according to the first random result and a signature hash value obtained by reading a memory, and generating an eleventh result through a fourth random number generated by the random number generator, atenth result generated by reading a user signature private key obtained by reading the memory and the third result, and an eighth result generated according to a first random number and a fourth random number generated by the random number generator; and generating a twelfth result through the generated eleventh result, and a seventh result generated by a second constant obtained by reading the memory, the user signature private key and the fourth random number generated by the random number generator, and outputting, by the CPU, a signature value using the third result and the twelfth resultas coordinates. The objective of defending SPA, DPA, FA and other side channel attacks is achieved.

Description

Technical field [0001] The invention relates to the field of information security, in particular to an SM2 signature method using a coprocessor to resist attacks. Background technique [0002] The SM2 algorithm is an elliptic curve public key cryptographic algorithm issued by the State Cryptography Administration. It is used to replace the RSA algorithm in our country's commercial cryptographic system. The digital signature generation process of SM2 algorithm is: calculate e=Hv(M), generate random number k, calculate elliptic curve point (x1,y1)=[k]G, calculate r=(e+x1)modn, calculate s=( (1+dA)-1·(kr·dA)) modn, the signature of the output message M is (r, s). The most basic operation in the SM2 algorithm is the point multiplication operation. The point multiplication operation consists of point addition operation and point multiplication operation. The time and energy consumed to perform a point addition operation and a point multiplication operation are different, which is ver...

Claims

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Application Information

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Patent Type & Authority Applications(China)
IPC IPC(8): H04L9/32H04L9/30H04L9/00
CPCH04L9/002H04L9/003H04L9/004H04L9/3066H04L9/3247H04L9/3252
Inventor 陆舟于华章
Owner FEITIAN TECHNOLOGIES