Signature method and apparatus based on elliptic curve, computer device and storage medium

Abstract

The invention discloses a signature method and apparatus based on an elliptic curve, a computer device and a storage medium. The method comprises the following steps: generating, by a first communication terminal, a first random number k1, and calculating a first signature factor Q1 according to k1 and an elliptic curve base point G; calculating a to-be-signed message according to a preset hash algorithm to obtain a preprocessing result e; sending Q1 and e to a second communication end; receiving first signature information r, a second signature factor s1 and a third signature factor s2 sent by the second communication terminal; and generating second signature information s according to k1 and second random numbers d1, r, s1, and s2 to obtain a signature result (r, s). Through the interaction calculation of both parties of the communication, the second signature information generated by the first communication terminal and the first signature information generated by the second communication terminal constitute the signature result, and the real private key does not appear in the first communication terminal or the second communication terminal in any form, so that the security ofthe signature is improved.

Description

technical field [0001] The present invention relates to the fields of mobile security and computer programs, in particular to an elliptic curve-based signature method, device, computer equipment and storage medium. Background technique [0002] As network security issues become more and more serious, the impact is also growing. Digital signatures are used to realize the reliability of user identity and the integrity of information. [0003] In the traditional signature process, the signer generates a public-private key pair, signs the message with the private key, and sends the message, public key, and signature result to the signature verifier, who uses the public key to verify the signature. In traditional application scenarios, the server is usually the signer, and the client is the signature verifier. Assuming that the server is relatively safe, the private key will not be leaked, and only the public key needs to be protected (to prevent it from being replaced). For exa...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

[0004] However, traditional application scenarios can no longer meet all requirements. In some scenarios, the client needs to generate a signature, and the server verifies the signature. In this scenario, the client uses the private key to sign, and the server uses the public key to verify the signature.

As a weak end (such as a smartphone), the client is limited in its ability to protect the private key. Once the private key is leaked, the attacker can forge the signature, which puts the entire signature system at risk.

Images