Apparatus, system and method for sce
a technology of sce and apparatus, applied in the field of apparatus, a system and a method of sce, can solve the problems of high cost complex handover signalling, and high cost of (authentication and key agreement) procedure in terms of additional signalling load and complexity in ue implementation
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first exemplary embodiment
[0064]In this exemplary embodiment, new keys for confidentially protecting the U-Plane traffic between the UE 10, and the MeNB 20 and the SeNB 30 (hereinafter, sometimes referred to as “UP keys”) are derived from the same KeNB. The MeNB 20 derives the UP key for the SeNB 30, and sends it to the SeNB 30.
[0065]There are two options as to how to derive the UP keys as follows.
(Option 1)
[0066]FIG. 3 shows key hierarchy in this option. The illustrated key hierarchy includes KeNB, KRRCenc, KRRCint, KUPint, KUPenc, and KUPenc-S.
[0067]Among them, the KeNB is a key shared upon communication between the UE 10 and the MeNB 20, and can be derived by the UE 10 and the MME 40 from KASME. The KRRCenc is a key which can be derived from the KeNB and used for protecting RRC (Radio Resource Control) traffic with a particular encryption algorithm. The KRRCint is a key which can be derived from the KeNB and used for protecting the RRC traffic with a particular integrity algorithm. The KUPint is a key whi...
second exemplary embodiment
KeNB
[0081]In this exemplary embodiment, UP keys are derived from different KeNB. There are two options as to how to derive the UP keys as follows.
(Option 1)
[0082]FIG. 6 shows key hierarchy in this option. The illustrated key hierarchy includes separate KeNB-M and KeNB-S. The KeNB-M is a key used for the MeNB 20 to derive the KRRCenc, the KRRCint, the KUPint and the KUPenc. On the other hand, the KeNB-S is a key used for the SeNB 30 to derive the KUPenc. The KUPenc derived by the MeNB 20 differs from that derived by the SeNB 30, because the KeNB-M and KeNB-S differ from each other.
[0083]In operations, as shown in FIG. 7, the MME 40 firstly derives the separate KeNB-M and KeNB-S from the KASME (step S21), and then sends the derived KeNB-M and KeNB-S to the MeNB 20 (step S22).
[0084]The SeNB 30 informs the MeNB 20 about the algorithm information, if necessary (step S23).
[0085]The MeNB 20 derives its own KUPenc from the received KeNB-M (step S24), and send the received KeNB-S to the SeNB...
fourth exemplary embodiment
[0103]FIG. 11 shows key hierarchy in this exemplary embodiment. The illustrated key hierarchy is different from that shown in FIG. 8, in that as a substituted for the KeNB**, KXX is derived from the KeNB-M, and that the KUPenc for the SeNB 30 is derived from the KXX. The KXX is sent from the MeNB 20 to the SeNB 30.
[0104]In operations, although the illustration is omitted, the MeNB 20 derives its own KUPenc, and derives the KXX from the KeNB-M. Then, the MeNB 20 sends the derived KXX to the SeNB 30.
[0105]The SeNB 30 derives its own KUPenc from the KXX.
[0106]In parallel with these processes, the MeNB 20 negotiates with the UE 10 such that the UE 10 can derive both KUPenc for the MeNB 20 and the SeNB 30. Specifically, the MeNB 20 sends to the UE 10 information necessary for deriving both KUPenc for the MeNB 20 and the SeNB 30, such as some parameters, indicators indicating encryption algorithms, and the like.
[0107]The UE 10 derives both KUPenc for the MeNB 20 and the SeNB 30 based on t...
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