A Controller Area Network Automotive Bus Alarm Gateway for Detecting Injection Attacks

Abstract

Due to a multi-master characteristic (any device accessed to the CAN bus can send messages) of a CAN (Controller Area Network) bus, injection-type attack cannot be prevented. The invention discloses a formation method for a CAN automobile bus alarm gateway detecting injection type attack. In a condition of not changing hardware and software of an ECU (Electronic Control Unit) on the CAN bus, through modifying software of the CAN bus gateway only, by utilizing ID of the ECU sending data frames in a CAN bus protocol, time for responding to other ECU requesting frames, the maximal value and the minimal value of data per se and the period for data generation, whether application in the injection-type attack such as DOS attack, disguised attack and fuzzy attack that sending counterfeit data is in presence or not is judged, so that safety technology problem in the prior CAN bus is solved.

Description

technical field [0001] The present invention relates to a kind of generation method of the CAN (Controller Area Networks) automobile bus alarm gateway of the controller local area network that detects the injection type attack, relate in particular to the electronic control unit ECU (Electronic Control Unit) hardware and software on the CAN bus without changing , by only modifying the software of the CAN bus gateway, use the ID of the data frame sent by the ECU in the CAN bus protocol, the time to respond to other ECU request frames, the maximum and minimum values ​​of the data itself, and the cycle of data generation to judge whether there is a Dos or a fake Applications in injection attacks where ECUs or newly added ECUs send out fake data. Background technique [0002] The controller area network CAN was first developed by Bosch in 1985 to build an in-vehicle network. It is an effective, reliable and fast serial transmission bus between ECUs in the car. It became an inter...

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Problems solved by technology

[0007] (3) All other ECUs can receive data from a sending ECU at the same time, and all ECUs have filtering capabilities to limit the reception of unnecessary data;

[0011] (7) CAN bus has no security components, it assumes that all ECUs are legal, trustworthy and work according to their parameter settings

[0015] (3) Fuzzy attack: Randomly generate a message ID and send it to the CAN bus. The ID message may not be on the bus (the attack with the same ID on the bus is similar to a counterfeit attack), and its purpose is to destroy the normal operation of the car (the data is messed up) , not within the normal range), serious may lead to accidents

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