A post-quantum password-authenticated key exchange method based on error learning on modules

Abstract

The invention discloses a post-quantum password authentication key exchange method based on error learning on the model. The steps include: 1) when a client C initiates a key exchange with a server S, the client C calculates and sends the key exchange to S; 2) S is calculated using Con(σ s ) to get the negotiated key k σ and the auxiliary coordination value v, and then generate S’s identity verification information k and information k″ for verifying the client’s identity and send it to C; 3) After C generates the coordination polynomial, according to σ c , v generates its negotiation key k σ ; Then, after verifying the identity of the server, generate self-authentication information k' and session key sk c , and send k' to S; 4) S compares k' and k" to verify C, and if the verification passes, calculate the session key sk s .

Description

technical field [0001] The invention belongs to the technical field of network security, and relates to a password authentication key exchange scheme, in particular to a post-quantum password authentication key exchange method based on modular error learning. Background technique [0002] On an insecure channel, the process of negotiating a common key between two communicating parties according to a certain agreement is called key exchange. However, the key exchange protocol itself cannot identify the identities of the two communicating parties, so it cannot avoid the threat of man-in-the-middle attacks. In practice, authentication is usually combined with a key exchange scheme. There are two commonly used authentication methods: one is based on public key infrastructure (PKI) to achieve authentication; the other is based on user-friendly passwords to achieve authentication. Compared with PKI, password authentication does not require the intervention of a trusted third par...

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Problems solved by technology

[0007] To sum up, for post-quantum password-authenticated key exchange protocols, there are the following deficiencies in the prior art: First, there are few lattice-based password-authenticated key exchange protocols, and most of them are based on CRS mode The design and operation efficiency is low, so it is considered to be limited to theoretical realization and cannot be applied to real-world deployment; second, the existing schemes are not rigorous enough in parameter selection, post-quantum security analysis, and correctness analysis, resulting in schemes The performance and security strength of the solution do not meet the actual application requirements; third, the reusability and scalability of the solution are not strong, and the existing solution can only be applied to one security requirement. To achieve multiple security requirements , it is necessary to re-select and analyze parameters, resulting in poor scalability of the solution and poor reproducibility of the code

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