Unlock instant, AI-driven research and patent intelligence for your innovation.

Incentive Mechanism of Crowd Sensing under Multi-task Cooperative Application

A crowd-sensing and incentive mechanism technology, applied in multi-program device, program control design, inter-program communication, etc., can solve the problem that incentive mechanism does not deeply consider multi-cooperative task application, lack of multi-task correlation modeling and consideration, Not applicable to problems such as multi-cooperative task applications

Active Publication Date: 2019-04-30
BEIJING UNIV OF POSTS & TELECOMM
View PDF5 Cites 0 Cited by
  • Summary
  • Abstract
  • Description
  • Claims
  • Application Information

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

However, the above incentive designs are all aimed at a single cooperative task. Due to their lack of modeling and consideration of the correlation between multi-tasks, they will not be suitable for the application of multi-cooperative tasks.
[0005] As far as we know so far, the existing incentive mechanism has not considered the application of multi-cooperative tasks in depth, that is, each task requires a group of users to cooperate together, and multiple tasks are related

Method used

the structure of the environmentally friendly knitted fabric provided by the present invention; figure 2 Flow chart of the yarn wrapping machine for environmentally friendly knitted fabrics and storage devices; image 3 Is the parameter map of the yarn covering machine
View more

Image

Smart Image Click on the blue labels to locate them in the text.
Viewing Examples
Smart Image
  • Incentive Mechanism of Crowd Sensing under Multi-task Cooperative Application
  • Incentive Mechanism of Crowd Sensing under Multi-task Cooperative Application
  • Incentive Mechanism of Crowd Sensing under Multi-task Cooperative Application

Examples

Experimental program
Comparison scheme
Effect test

Embodiment 1

[0082] This embodiment is based on the image 3 The illustrated isomorphic multitasking scenario is described, mainly the incentive mechanism in the complete information isomorphic multitasking scenario. The specific setting is: the server has multiple isomorphic tasks, that is, the threshold of the number of users for each task is the same, set m 0 , the social value of each task is the same, set to v 0 . Unit cost c for user i to complete each task i the same, ie At the same time all users can participate in all tasks. It mainly explains the incentive mechanism in the complete information isomorphic multi-task scenario. The specific design steps are as figure 2 shown. The main process of this embodiment is as follows:

[0083] (1) The server publishes the tasks to be completed, and has received user information that can complete these tasks, mainly the unit cost of each user participating in the task.

[0084] (2) The server can calculate the optimal user cost thr...

Embodiment 2

[0089] This embodiment is based on the Figure 5 The illustrated heterogeneous multitasking scenario is described, mainly the incentive mechanism in the complete information heterogeneous multitasking scenario. The specific setting is: each task j has its own user number threshold m j , and the value v it brings to the server j . The server acquires user participation cost information. It mainly explains the incentive mechanism in the complete information heterogeneous multi-task scenario. The specific design steps are as Figure 4 shown. The main process of this embodiment is as follows:

[0090] (1) The server publishes the tasks to be completed, and has received user information that can complete these tasks, mainly the unit cost of each user participating in the task.

[0091] (2) For each task in T, from the user set G j Choose the mth j Small user participation cost, denoted as

[0092] (3) If the unit cost is less than The sum of the user costs is greater ...

Embodiment 3

[0097] This embodiment is based on the image 3 The illustrated isomorphic multi-task scenario is described, mainly the incentive mechanism in the non-complete information isomorphic multi-task scenario. The specific setting is: the threshold of the number of users for each task is the same as the social value, which is recorded as m 0 and v 0 , and the unit cost distribution F(c) for users to complete each task is also the same. It mainly explains the incentive mechanism in the non-complete information isomorphic multi-task scenario. The specific design steps are as Image 6 shown. The main process of this embodiment is as follows:

[0098] (1) Given different cost thresholds, find the expected revenue E(u i ).

[0099] (2) Calculate the Nash equilibrium value of the cost threshold that maximizes the user's expected benefit.

[0100] (3) Calculate the Nash equilibrium value of the total compensation value that maximizes the expected utility of the server.

[0101] (4...

the structure of the environmentally friendly knitted fabric provided by the present invention; figure 2 Flow chart of the yarn wrapping machine for environmentally friendly knitted fabrics and storage devices; image 3 Is the parameter map of the yarn covering machine
Login to View More

PUM

No PUM Login to View More

Abstract

The present invention discloses crowd sensing incentive mechanisms for multitask cooperative application. The method mainly comprises the steps of: first, dividing application scenarios into four types including complete information and non-complete information, and isomorphic multitask and isomerous multitask according to difference of users and task types, and designing the corresponding crowd sensing incentive mechanisms based on the Stackelberg game model in different application scenarios; and then, designing two reward distribution functions to solve multitask reward distribution problems according to different application requirements, one of the reward distribution functions being based on the user number and the other of the reward distribution functions being based on task values. Nash equilibrium solutions of both-side effectiveness of users and a system server can be achieved in the four types of scenarios, the crowd sensing incentive mechanisms have time efficiency and can be suitable for real-time tasks, so that the system can obtain the maximum effectiveness value.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention relates to the technical field of group intelligence sensing applications, in particular to an incentive mechanism under a type of multi-task cooperation in group intelligence sensing applications. This method can maximize the utility of the system server. Background technique [0002] In recent years, with the development and wide application of mobile smart terminals, the application of crowd sensing has attracted extensive attention from industry and academia. The purpose of crowd sensing is to allow qualified smartphone users to collect data without spending a lot of extra manpower and material resources to collect data, but most of these applications are based on voluntary participation. When users participate in crowd sensing applications, they need to upload some data, so there will be corresponding costs, such as loss of time, energy and bandwidth resources. In location-related sensing applications, users may face the threat of ...

Claims

the structure of the environmentally friendly knitted fabric provided by the present invention; figure 2 Flow chart of the yarn wrapping machine for environmentally friendly knitted fabrics and storage devices; image 3 Is the parameter map of the yarn covering machine
Login to View More

Application Information

Patent Timeline
no application Login to View More
Patent Type & Authority Patents(China)
IPC IPC(8): G06F9/50G06F9/54
CPCG06F9/5083G06F9/545
Inventor 孙咏梅骆淑云纪越峰
Owner BEIJING UNIV OF POSTS & TELECOMM