Trusted BMC (Baseboard Management Controller)-based server safe-starting method

Abstract

A method for securely starting a server based on a trusted BMC, comprising: after the server is powered on, the CPLD is trusted to measure, if the CPLD is correct, then enter the next step, otherwise the CPLD is restored; after confirming that the CPLD is correct, Power on the BMC, and measure the reliability of the BMC boot program. If the boot program is correct, go to the next step, otherwise restore the BMC boot program; after confirming that the BMC boot program is correct, image the BMC operating system Perform credible measurement, if the operating system image of the BMC is correct, start the internal operating system of the BMC; after the BMC runs normally, perform credible measurement on the BIOS, if the BIOS is correct, enter the next step, otherwise restore the BIOS; Perform trust measurement on the server; conduct trust measurement on the core software, establish a chain of trust after confirmation, and complete the server security startup. The above trusted BMC-based server secure startup method can improve security performance.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention relates to the technical field of computer security, in particular to a method for safely starting a server based on a trusted BMC. Background technique [0002] There is a dedicated programmable logic device (Complex Programmable Logic Device, CPLD for short) in the server, which is used to control the power-on sequence of the server. The Basic Input / Output System (BIOS) is used to initialize hardware, manage hardware resources, shield platform features, and boot the operating system. It is a bridge connecting basic computer hardware and system software. BIOS also has the ability to access and control computer hardware, once it is damaged or tampered with, it will bring great security threats. Normally, in the power-on sequence of CPLD, the BMC is started first, and after the BMC runs normally, the BIOS is powered on to complete the operating system startup. If the firmware of the CPLD is damaged or rewritten, the BMC can be bypassed a...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

(3) The integrity measurement module is only deployed in the boot program of the BMC, ignoring the protection of the boot program itself, and there are still potential security risks

(4) The BMC is regarded as an embedded system, and a relatively complex software stack is deployed in the boot program and system layer. The system complexity is too high and the system overhead is too large

(5) The trusted cryptographic module deployed on the motherboard cannot be invoked by the BMC firmware, and lacks support for security functions such as trusted measurement and encryption for the BMC

It can be seen that due to the different interfaces of trusted cryptographic modules on the motherboard, it is impossible to guarantee that the BMC can have the ability to call secure interfaces for different types of trusted cryptographic modules.

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