Privacy protection method and related equipment

Abstract

The embodiment of the invention discloses a privacy protection method and related equipment. The method is used for reducing leakage risk when ciphertext transmission is carried out. The method provided by the embodiment of the invention comprises the steps that operator equipment receives a blind ciphertext sent by user equipment (UE), wherein the blind ciphertext is an identity ID suite obtainedthrough encryption and blinding processing, and the ID suite comprises an identification code and authentication information; and the operator device decrypts the blind ciphertext according to a private key, thereby acquiring a blind plaintext, and the operator equipment sends the blind plaintext to the UE. The embodiment of the invention also provides the related equipment. According to the embodiment of the invention, the leakage risk when ciphertext transmission is carried out can be reduced.

Description

technical field [0001] The present invention relates to the field of electricity, in particular to a privacy protection method and related equipment. Background technique [0002] In a traditional network, user identification is accomplished through an International Mobile Subscriber Identification Number (IMSI, International Mobile Subscriber Identification Number). Each subscriber's Subscriber Identification Module (SIM, Subscriber Identification Module) card has an IMSI identifier, and the mobile operator (MNO, MobileNetwork Operator) stores the corresponding relationship between the IMSI and the subscriber's subscription. At the same time, the SIM card and the MNO reserve a shared key for the same IMSI, which is used for authentication between the network and the user. [0003] In the proprietary protocol of the Internet of Vehicles (LTE-V, Long Term Evolution to Vihicle), each user who joins the Internet of Vehicles has an application-layer user identity reserved for t...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

[0005] However, in the prior art, the shared key is shared between the MNO and all UEs within its jurisdiction. If the PCA colludes with any UE to obtain the shared key, it can decrypt all the ciphertexts sent by the MNO to the PCA. The ciphertext is selected by PCA, so PCA decrypts the target ciphertext through the shared secret key to obtain the target PMSI and target authentication key, that is, PCA knows the use of PMSI of all UEs, and the risk of leakage is extremely high

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