Ballot integrity systems

Abstract

Disclosed are voting systems based on paper ballots that provide integrity of the election outcome through the novel use of encrypted votes and other techniques. In some example embodiments, holes through layers allow voters to see and mark symbols on lower layers, carbonless coatings allow voters to obtain substantially identical marks on facing surfaces, self-adhesive stickers are removed from one position and placed by voters hiding vote-revealing indicia on a second position, and scratch-off layers bearing vote-revealing indicia are destroyed while being removed to expose coded information. Simplified cryptography for realizing these systems is also presented. Related systems allow those with various disabilities to develop and check voted ballot forms that are substantially indistinguishable from those voted by other voters. Inclusion of write-in votes is provided for. Also provided are inclusion of provisional ballots and spoilt ballots and integration with registration sign-in.

Description

[0001]The present application is a Continuation In Part of U.S. patent application, by the present applicant, titled “Secret-Ballot Systems with Voter-Verifiable Integrity,” filed Jan. 21, 2003 with Ser. No. 10 / 348,547 now U.S. Pat No. 7,210,617. Priority is claimed from: U.S. Provisional Application, by the present applicant, titled “Having your receipt and secret ballot too,” U.S. PTO 60 / 358,109, filed Feb. 20, 2002; U.S. Provisional Application, by the present applicant, titled “Layered receipts with reduced shared data,” U.S. PTO 60 / 412,749, filed Sep. 23, 2002; and United States Provisional Application, by the present applicant, titled “Layered receipts with reduced shared data,” U.S. PTO 60 / 412,749, filed Sep. 23, 2002.[0002]The present application claims priority from the following U.S. Provisional Applications, by the present applicant, that are hereby included by reference in their entirety: (a) U.S. Provisional application No. 60 / 716,215, titled “Symmetric punched and daub...

AI Technical Summary

Benefits of technology

[0105]Disclosed are voting systems based on paper ballots that provide integrity of the election outcome through the novel use of encrypted votes and other techniques.

[0120]Other embodiments encode votes graphically, for example, treating each pixel of each letter of a candidate name separately. The pixels of one half ballot can be combined with those of the other half by superimposing the two halves and viewing the light transmitted through the sandwiched combination. A kind of “exclusive-or” combining can be achieved by known and substantially improved novel techniques. For example, effective media and printing techniques are disclosed as well as the use of metamer filters that eliminate background speckle and substantially increase image clarity. By committing to some of the pixels on one half and some on the other, in such a way that letters are determined by either half, and opening all the commits of bits of the half removed, no separate encrypted value is needed. Moreover, allowing each half to be divided into parts substantially in the same random way, and releasing different parts from different halves, the probability of a substantially improper ballot yielding a proper half is significantly reduced.

Problems solved by technology

It is believed that a central issue in election systems is their ability to convince voters that the votes of all valid voters participating in the election are correctly counted.

Another issue in voting systems is ballot secrecy, which should prevent other than the voter from learning how the voter voted, with or without cooperation of the voter.

Some systems can process ballots from multiple sources into a single batch of outcomes, but the ability of those operating the system and supplying the forms to discriminate or track batches of ballots can be an issue in some settings.

So-called “ballot rotation” systems are presumably aimed at addressing this, but often are imperfect in concept and introduce additional costs and errors in implementation.

Substances added to ballots, such as coatings, can have environmental and / or toxic effects and be problematic for recycling, and thus may have additional costs and / or be undesirable in some settings.

It does not provide autonomy, because one or more persons assist the voter in the act of voting.

Unfortunately, it may be particularly difficult for a blind person to ascertain with certainty who overhears their votes.

Not only does this give poor voter privacy, but it also facilitates various types of so-called “improper influence,” such as at least potential confirmation in vote buying or coercion schemes.

Integrity issues are also raised, since there may be little to ensure the voter or others that the poll worker records the votes faithfully.

This is potentially better as far as voter concerns, although it enables some improper influence schemes.

While such permissive schemes may offer some convenience, they facilitate various kinds of fraud and improper influence, and are not considered further here.

Furthermore, it is believed often less costly, time consuming and cumbersome to generate audio in various languages compared to typesetting and laying out corresponding forms.

There are, however, believed to be substantial procurement, storage, and transportation costs, as well as reliability issues for such hardware devices, which apparently integrate printers and scanners with touchscreen user interfaces.

These can only be used, however, by the small fraction of the blind population (believed sometimes estimated at roughly 5% of the legally blind in the United States) who are currently able to read Braille adequately.

A hybrid Braille and ink ballot would address this issue, but would not be very practical, as it would greatly increasing the size, thickness, handling difficulty, and cost of ballots and processing.

The tactile audio approach does not provide voters using it with the integrity and secrecy protections of the encrypted vote / receipt systems mentioned earlier.

As another example, readable ballots do not provide the secrecy advantages of encrypted ballots, such as: for handling while in a polling place or for so-called provisional ballots or what may be referred to as “vote-from-any-precinct,” which both require that the voter identity be linked to ballots during protracted handling / processing.

Known voting systems make extensive use of sophisticated types of cryptographic functions and protocols (such as, for instance, public key, secret-shared homomorphic systems), limiting the ease with which they can be widely understood by the public.

One known problem with such techniques, however, is that the original may be apparently well marked, but the copy does not come through well.

With demand printed ballots, physical structure related to so-called “ballot style,” such as holes or scratch-off may be problematic and can lead to general formats that are less than optimal in terms of clarity, economy, and aesthetics.

Physical structures have increased associated direct and handling costs.

The resulting ballot exposes the votes to those who might see it in transport and handling, which in some settings is not a desirable feature.

Moreover, such forms to not provide an encrypted vote function.

Furthermore, the unused portion of stickers in known systems also reveals the vote and does not serve as a receipt in an encrypted voting system.

Verification by voters, however, is cumbersome with manual poll books, since the information is often neither optimally complete nor well organized for the task at hand.

As with voting machines, automated registration systems provide little transparency to voters.

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