Key management method

Abstract

The invention relates to a key management method which is an enhanced RSNA four-stage handshake protocol, which comprises the following steps: step 1, an authenticator adds a key negotiation ID (KNID) and a message integrity code (MIC) to a message (1) and then sends the message to a requester; step 2, the requester receives the message (1) and then checks whether the MIC character field container therein is correct, if incorrect, the requester directly discard the message, otherwise performs other checks, and sends a message (2) to the authenticator after the check succeeds; step 3, the authenticator checks the message (2) after reception and sends a message (3) to the requester after the check succeeds; step 4, the requester checks the message (3) after reception and sends a message (4) to the authenticator after the check succeeds; step 5, the authenticator checks the message (4) after reception, if the check succeeds, the four-stage handshake protocol is completed, and the authenticator and the requester reach an agreement after negotiation to produce a unicast temporal key (UTK) and obtain the group multicast master key (GMK) of the other party. The invention solves the DoS attack problem of the key management protocol in the existing RSNA security mechanism.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention relates to a key management method, in particular to a key management method for RSNA. Background technique [0002] In order to solve the security loopholes in the WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) security mechanism defined in the WLAN (Wireless Local Area Network) international standard ISO / IEC 8802-11, the IEEE organization promulgated the IEEE 802.11i standard, based on backward compatibility In the above, the Robust Security Network Association (RSNA) technology is proposed to make up for the security loopholes in WEP. [0003] RSNA realizes authentication and key distribution functions through IEEE 802.1x and 4-way Handshake protocol (4-way Handshake) based on Extended Authentication Protocol (EAP). These security mechanisms can solve the security problem of WLAN well, but because the security is more considered in the design of this mechanism, and the usability of the protocol is not considered too much, so the DoS attack problem ex...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

Although the calculation of the unicast ephemeral key is not expensive, it will not cause a CPU exhaustion attack, but if the attacker intentionally increases the frequency of sending forged messages 1, there is a danger of memory exhaustion

This kind of forgery attack is easy to implement, and the harm caused is relatively serious. A successful attack will make all the previous efforts on the authentication process come to naught