Non-contact CPU (Central Processing Unit) card entrance guard reader

Abstract

The invention discloses a non-contact CPU (Central Processing Unit) card entrance guard reader comprising a radio frequency part, a 485 communication part, a security module part, a Wigan output and external control part, a power supply part, an external connection part, a microcontroller part and other parts. The non-contact CPU card entrance guard reader is internally provided with a PSAM (Pilot Symbol Assisted Modulation) card and applies security certification read-write mechanisms of the PSAM card and a CPU card. The CPU card entrance guard reader builds an integral and strict key management system by adopting the security certification of the PSAM card and the CPU card, sufficiently uses the security characteristics of the CPU card and comprises key systems of the CPU card and the PSAM card; after a key is input into the PSAM card, the key cannot be externally read, the PSAM card is inserted into card reading equipment, two-way validation is carried out through the PSAM card and the CPU card, a verified message is calculated through the participation of random data, and a same card is different every time when swiped on one equipment, therefore a counterfeit card is thoroughly prevented.

Description

[technical field] [0001] The invention relates to a card reading device, in particular to a non-contact CPU card access control card reader. [Background technique] [0002] At the beginning of 2009, researchers in Germany and the United States successfully cracked the security algorithm of NXP's Mifare1 chip. Mifare1 chip is mainly used in access control system access control cards, as well as some small payment cards. The application range has covered the world. The researchers announced the MIFARE series There are weak links in the security of the product. By studying the communication data between the reader and the card, we can find the encryption algorithm and authentication communication protocol of this Mifare1 card, and there are two ways to get the partition password of the MIFARE class logical encryption card. , through this method, the saboteur can easily obtain the password of an M1 card within 40ms using a very cheap device, which brings a fatal blow to the M1 c...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

[0002] At the beginning of 2009, researchers in Germany and the United States successfully cracked the security algorithm of NXP's Mifare1 chip. Mifare1 chip is mainly used in access control system access control cards, as well as some small payment cards. The application range has covered the world. The researchers announced the MIFARE series There are weak links in the security of the product. By studying the communication data between the reader and the card, we can find the encryption algorithm and authentication communication protocol of this Mifare1 card, and there are two ways to get the partition password of the MIFARE class logical encryption card. , through this method, the saboteur can easily obtain the password of an M1 card within 40ms using a very cheap device, which brings a fatal blow to the M1 card

[0005] However, access control card readers currently on the market mainly adopt two methods, but both of them have serious defects: 1. The card number of the ID card or Mifare one card is used as the card number of the access control user card. Dedicated key, its security is very low, the card number can be simply read and copied to another card; 2. After the Mifare1 card is authenticated, the card number pre-written in the card is read and written. However, at the beginning of 2009 , researchers in Germany and the United States have successfully cracked the security algorithm of the Mifare 1 chip. By studying the communication data between the reader and the card, they have found the encryption algorithm of the Mifare one card and the authentication communication protocol, and there are two methods You can get the partition password of the MIFARE one logical encryption card

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