Validation method and validation device of chip with secure booting function

Abstract

The invention discloses a validation method and a validation device of a chip with a secure booting function. The validation method of the chip with the secure booting function comprises the following steps that the validation device carrying BOOT procedures of a user reads a chip secret key used for verifying the chip with the secure booting function after the BOOT procedures guided by the user are started by the chip with the secure booting function and the BOOT procedures of the user are confirmed to be verified; the validation device judges whether the chip with the secure booting function is replaced or not according to the chip secret key; if the chip with the secure booting function is replaced, the chip of the secure booting function is stopped operating, a single board is prevented from starting, a network is prevented from being illegally embezzled and an operator network is prevented from being attacked, and therefore the safety of networks is guaranteed.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention relates to the field of communication technology, in particular to a chip verification method and a verification device with a secure startup function. Background technique [0002] The traditional single-board secure boot technology is positive and executed sequentially. The core of the technology is a chip containing one-time programmable technology (English full name: One Time Programable, abbreviated as: OTP) storage space, and the chip Support security encryption algorithm. [0003] In the prior art, the safe boot program of the single board is: the central processing unit (full English name: Central Processing Unit, CPU) starts its internal fixed user boot (English name: BOOT) program, and initializes, and After that, the CPU invokes the public key (English full name: Public KEY, abbreviated as: PKEY) to verify the integrity of the user BOOT program, and after determining that the user BOOT program is complete, it decrypts the user...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

[0004] However, in the prior art, the PKEY used to check the integrity of the user BOOT program is fixed, easy to leak and be cracked, and since the BOOT KEY and SMEK are readable, if these three keys are hacked crack, the device becomes transparent to hackers. If a hacker wants to crack the board software and product software on the board, he only needs to install the fixed BOOT program, user BOOT program, PKEY, BOOT KEY, and SMEK that originally had security functions. If the chip is replaced with an original chip that does not enable security functions, a module with a hacker program can be cloned, thereby illegally embezzling the network or attacking the operator's network. Therefore, the security boot program of the single board in the prior art has serious problems. of security holes

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