A Lightweight Proof Method for Scalable IoT Devices

Abstract

A scalable lightweight proof method for IoT devices, including the following specific steps: validator setup, using K 0 Initialize the device as a commitment key and perform recursive verification of other keys; prover initialization, each prover P is initialized with public and private values, and each verifier V is related by two devices for authentication and software integrity Key initialization; start remote attestation, verifier V generates a new random value Nnew and creates attestation request (Attest req ); key leak, verifier V broadcasts the verification key to all nearby provers P; authentication report, each verifier V checks whether its cluster ID is included in the second list in the attestation request (A calc ); physical and remote attack detection to detect remotely compromised devices through the aggregation of failure-to-participate attestation reports. The invention reduces runtime overhead and memory footprint, and can be used in both static and dynamic networks consisting of thousands of heterogeneous IoT devices.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention relates to a scalable lightweight certification method for IoT devices. [0002] technical background [0003] Contemporary IoT applications are distributed in nature, embedded in widely deployed heterogeneous computing devices forming large mesh networks or swarm physics. Modern IoT devices create a huge new attack surface as they routinely deal with privacy-sensitive issues and perform security-critical tasks. Remote attestation detects cyber threats by remotely verifying the internal state of network-embedded devices by trusted entities, and is used to reveal the misbehavior of network protocols and IoT devices. At present, the popular DARPA and SCAPI proof methods all consider long-range physical attacks. But DARPA is not suitable for low-end embedded devices and public key encryption is expensive; and SCAPI must rely on some hard assumptions (such as requiring half of the devices in the network to be uncompromising), and the memory ...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

But DARPA is not suitable for low-end embedded devices and public key encryption is expensive; and SCAPI must rely on some hard assumptions (such as requiring half of the devices in the network to be uncompromising), and the memory usage and power consumption are extremely high due to the discovery and exchange of many channel keys.

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