ADS-B autonomous cheating-proof method based on completeness information of GNSS

Abstract

Provided is an ADS-B autonomous cheating-proof method based on completeness information of the GNSS. The method is used to verify an ADS-B air position message which is sent by an ADS-B emitter actively on the basis of the completeness information of the GNSS. An RAIM algorithm is used to predict the HPL value of the position of an airplane, a predicted NUC value of the position of the airplane can be further obtained, whether the predicted NUC value is the same with the NUC value obtained by analyzing the ADS-B air position message is determined, and the authenticity of the received ADS-B air position message is determined. According to the method, the authenticity of the ADS-B air position message can be determined efficiently and rapidly without hardware increase of an ADS-B receiver, and the method can be applied to an independent cheating-proof interference module and thus embedded into the common ADS-B receiver.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention belongs to the cross-technical field of global satellite navigation and information security, and in particular relates to an ADS-B autonomous anti-spoofing method based on GNSS integrity information. technical background [0002] The ADS-B system is Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast System. It consists of multiple ground stations and airborne systems. It completes two-way data communication in a networked, multipoint-to-multipoint manner. It is mainly used for ground-to-air and air-to-air surveillance. Aircraft equipped with the ADS-B system can broadcast their own precise position and other data (such as speed, altitude, and whether the aircraft is turning, climbing or descending, etc.) through the data link. The ADS-B receiver is combined with the air traffic control system and the airborne ADS-B system of other aircraft to provide accurate and real-time surveillance information in the air and ground. [0003] The ADS-B syste...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

[0008] (3) Threat of ADS-B data abuse: Transparent and open ADS-B data may be used by hostile elements to illegally track, locate and confirm a certain aircraft (such as a VIP plane, an airline flight, a corporate business jet, etc.), which can be obtained Important information related to the aircraft, such as political, commercial, and personal intentions, based on which a substantial threat to the aircraft is implemented

[0009] (4) Threat of delay, error or failure of ADS-B data: attackers may impose wireless interference on a specific area, resulting in failure or deviation of ADS-B system services and satellite navigation and positioning data

[0010] (5) Vulnerability threats faced by GNSS such as signal interference and electronic spoofing: Since the ADS-B system mainly relies on GNSS to locate the target, but it cannot determine the authenticity and integrity of the position information, the GNSS The data integrity of the system is also an important factor affecting the safety and quality of ADS-B surveillance data

The navigation data source of the ADS-B system is too dependent on GNSS. If the positioning information given by the GNSS system is wrong or invalid, the ADS-B system cannot distinguish it, so the system will not work normally.

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