Expandable lightweight proving method for Internet of Things equipment

Abstract

An expandable lightweight proof method for Internet of Things equipment comprises the following specific steps: verifier setting: K0 is used as committed key initialization equipment, and recursion inspection of other keys is executed; prover initialization: each prover P is initialized by using public and private values, and each verifier V is initialized by using two equipment related keys for authentication and software integrity; starting of a remote proof: the verifier V generates a new random value Nnew and creates a proof request (Attest<req>); secret key leak: the verifier V broadcaststhe verification secret key to all nearby testers P; authentication report implementation: each verifier V checking whether its cluster ID is included in a second list (A<calc>) of attestation requests; physical and remote attack detection: remotely damaged devices are detected by aggregation incapable of participating in proof reports. According to the method, the running overhead and memory occupation are reduced, and the method can be used for static and dynamic networks consisting of thousands of heterogeneous Internet of Things devices.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention relates to a scalable lightweight certification method for IoT devices. [0002] technical background [0003] Contemporary IoT applications are distributed in nature, embedded in widely deployed heterogeneous computing devices forming large mesh networks or swarm physics. Modern IoT devices create a huge new attack surface as they routinely deal with privacy-sensitive issues and perform security-critical tasks. Remote attestation detects cyber threats by remotely verifying the internal state of network-embedded devices by trusted entities, and is used to reveal the misbehavior of network protocols and IoT devices. At present, the popular DARPA and SCAPI proof methods all consider long-range physical attacks. But DARPA is not suitable for low-end embedded devices and public key encryption is expensive; and SCAPI must rely on some hard assumptions (such as requiring half of the devices in the network to be uncompromising), and the memory ...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

But DARPA is not suitable for low-end embedded devices and public key encryption is expensive; and SCAPI must rely on some hard assumptions (such as requiring half of the devices in the network to be uncompromising), and the memory usage and power consumption are extremely high due to the discovery and exchange of many channel keys.

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