Mobile phone shield signed key protection method

Abstract

The present invention provides a mobile phone shield signed key protection method, comprising: creating by a mobile phone shield user terminal the signature involved processes with a certain quantity in advance and setting the server executed processes; acquiring by the mobile phone shield user terminal a signature key and segmenting the key to obtain key fragments, wherein each signature involved process is allocated with a key fragment correspondingly, and after the blindness of the key fragments corresponding to the server executed processes, sending the key fragments to the server; randomly activating a plurality of signature involved processes by the cell phone shield user terminal and using the activated processes to process the signature information to perform threshold signature on the to-be-signed information according to the corresponding key fragments to obtain the signature fragments; and performing signature combination on the plurality of signature fragments by the mobile phone shield user terminal to obtain a full signature for the to-be-signed signature information. The method can avoid the risk of hijacking a number of signature fragments by malicious software in the communication link and avoids the dependence of the core signature fragment transmission on a secure channel.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention relates to the technical field of information security, in particular to a method for protecting a mobile phone shield signature key. Background technique [0002] The frequent use of the mobile shield signature key may easily lead to leakage. In particular, malware has the potential to hijack certain apps installed on the phone. [0003] At present, in the storage process of the general mobile phone shield signature key, although there is also a method of shard storage, it cannot be guaranteed that the shards held by the key shard holder cannot synthesize a complete key during the storage process. The communication link of key shards has the risk of being hijacked by malware. Among them, the risk of core signature shards, especially the shard holders who interact with the server, is further increased. Therefore, the transmission security of signature shards depends on the security of the channel. Safety cannot be guaranteed. Contents...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

[0002] The frequent use of the mobile shield signature key is likely to cause leakage

In particular, malware has the potential to hijack certain apps installed on the phone

[0003] At present, in the storage process of the general mobile phone shield signature key, although there is also a method of shard storage, it cannot be guaranteed that the shards held by the key shard holder cannot synthesize a complete key during the storage process. The communication link of key shards has the risk of being hijacked by malware. Among them, the risk of core signature shards, especially the shard holders who interact with the server, is further increased. Therefore, the transmission security of signature shards depends on the security of the channel. safe, not guaranteed

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