Off-line payment method and consumption terminal for electronic purse

Abstract

The invention discloses an off-line payment method and a consumption terminal for electronic purse. The method comprises the following steps: the consumption terminal obtains a signature stored in a user card, wherein the signature is generated by the private key of a card issuing party; and the consumption terminal verifies the signature and performs off-line payment by the electronic purse after the signature is verified. In the method, the week link that only a terminal security control module PSAM (purchase secure access module) is depended to identify whether the user card is true or false can be enhanced, and the card issuing party indirectly participates in the off-line consumption certification process of the electronic purse, thereby effectively preventing attackers from illegally copying false cards on batch by utilizing the week point of the off-line transaction of the electronic card at present. Meanwhile, the system risk is burdened on the card holder, and attackers have no opportunity if the card holder appropriately keeps the self card.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention relates to the technical field of smart cards, in particular to an electronic wallet offline payment method and a consumption terminal. Background technique [0002] The electronic wallet payment method currently used in the payment field is a security solution based on a symmetric key. The basic principle is to use 3DES (Triple DES, three times data encryption standard; DES: Data Encryption Standard, data encryption standard) to calculate MAC (Message Authentication Codes, information verification code) or encrypt the transmission data to be protected with a symmetric key, to Ensure sensitive data is not copied or tampered with. Since the key used by the 3DES algorithm is 16 bytes, the possibility of its logical combination is astronomical, so theoretically speaking, it is almost impossible to use the exhaustive method to crack 3DES. Even if it can be successful, the price will be quite high. [0003] Since the current electronic wall...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

At the same time, it is often believed that even if the master key in the PSAM is obtained, a hacker will not be able to reproduce a fake card with the amount

In fact, although it is more difficult for hackers to have more versions, there are still great benefits to be gained.

In addition, if the hacker can make a smart card with a private operating system, it is relatively easy to make fake cards with the amount in batches.

Therefore, the current e-wallet consumption process limited to the offline consumption mode, all legal authentication of the user card only depends on the PSAM side

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