Storage device data integrity protection method, controller thereof and system on chip

Abstract

The invention discloses a storage device data integrity protection method, a controller thereof and a system on chip, and the method comprises the steps: obtaining a safety memory access main body identifier contained in a memory access request based on the received memory access request; acquiring a memory access main body key corresponding to the security memory access main body identifier as afirst key according to a corresponding relationship between the stored security memory access main body identifier and the memory access main body key; carrying out nonlinear transformation on the first secret key to obtain a secret key related to a memory access address; the method comprises the steps of receiving a request type of a memory access request; and performing corresponding memory access operation on a first storage device, performing hash operation by adopting a preset operation mode on the basis of the second key and data corresponding to the memory access request, generating corresponding message authentication data, and storing the message authentication data for performing data integrity verification when the corresponding data stored in the first storage device is read. According to the scheme, integrity protection can be provided for the data in the first storage device.

Description

technical field [0001] The embodiments of this specification relate to the field of computer technology, and in particular to a method for protecting data integrity of a storage device, a controller thereof, and a system on chip. Background technique [0002] In a computer system, after the central processing unit (Central Processing Unit, CPU) data is written into a storage device such as a memory, there is a risk of being tampered with. For example, the bits in the memory can be flipped through the RowHammer method, or the memory data can be tampered with through physical hardware attacks. In this way, the data that has been written in the memory can be tampered without the CPU knowing at all, so hackers can achieve the purpose of maliciously invading the virtual machine data. [0003] Even if some CPUs encrypt the data written into the memory, the encrypted data can still be modified through methods such as ciphertext collision attacks. Therefore, even if the memory data...

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Problems solved by technology

[0003] Even if some CPUs encrypt the data written into the memory, the encrypted data can still be modified through methods such as ciphertext collision attacks. Therefore, there is currently a problem that even if the memory data is encrypted, it is difficult to resist hacker attacks.

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