Crypto chip system for resisting physical invasion and side-channel attack and implementation method thereof

Abstract

The invention discloses a crypto chip system for resisting physical invasion and side-channel attack and an implementation method thereof. The system comprises a dynamic key management module, a nonvolatile memory module and a trust management end. The invention also discloses an implementation method for the system, which comprises the following steps: (1) initializing, (2) key calling counting and starting; (3) key generation and recovery; (4) closing; and (5) opening. The key is dynamically extracted from a physically no-cloning key module, the trust management end is introduced, and the steps in the implementation method are combined, so that the nonvolatile memory of the chip has the capacity for resisting physical invasion and attack. The application number of times of each key is counted to implement forced updating after reaching the specified value, so that the side-channel attacker can not collect the same key to adequately reveal the sample, and thus, the side-channel attack becomes invalid.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention relates to the security field of cipher chips in information security, in particular to a cipher chip system resisting physical intrusion and bypass attack and a realization method thereof. Background technique [0002] With the development of science and technology, cryptographic chips have been widely used in various fields such as finance, telecommunications, government departments, public utilities, transportation, energy, medical care, national defense and the military. As the core of security technology, cryptographic chips are known as the information security industry The "trust origin" of the chain. [0003] The cryptographic algorithm used on the cryptographic chip can generally achieve computational security in traditional theoretical analysis, that is, it is computationally infeasible to break the cryptographic algorithm through theoretical calculation. Theoretical computing security implies two premises: [0004] a) Keys ar...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

This mode of operation is suitable for symmetric cryptographic algorithms against SCA, but not for public key cryptography

In addition, the security premise of this mode of operation is equivalent to using each key only once, which may have serious key distribution and management problems for practical applications

[0016] Although the aforementioned PUF can effectively increase the complexity of physical intrusion attacks, for SCA, PUF does not provide additional security

[0017] To sum up, the current encryption chip security measures are difficult to meet the two implicit premises of computing security mentioned above, that is, it is difficult to meet:

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