AKA authentication method and system for 5G communication

Abstract

The invention provides an AKA authentication method and system for 5G communication, and the method comprises the steps: encrypting data transmission between network elements of a 5G core network through employing a quantum key, and enabling the quantum key to distribute a shared quantum key between the network elements of the 5G core network through employing a quantum key distribution technology; the quantum random number generated by the quantum random number server can also be safely distributed among the network elements to be used as a shared quantum key; in the process of main authentication and key negotiation between user equipment (UE) and a 5G network, mutual authentication between the UE and the network is completed, and a key used between the UE and a service network in the subsequent communication process is negotiated; in the authentication and key negotiation process, key data, especially key data, in the authentication message are encrypted and protected by using a shared quantum key between network elements of the 5G core network, so that the security of the key negotiation process is greatly improved, and information leakage caused by key leakage in the process of transmitting information by using the 5G network by a user can be prevented.

Description

technical field [0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of quantum communication and 5G mobile communication, in particular to a 5G AKA authentication method and system. Background technique [0002] The statements in this section merely provide background art related to the present invention and do not necessarily constitute prior art. [0003] In the existing 5G authentication method 5G AKA, during the authentication process, the data transmission between the core network elements is transmitted in plain text without encryption protection, and key data such as Kausf and Kseaf need to be transmitted during the authentication process. These keys are used An anchor key for subsequent communication keys. Once an attacker eavesdrops on the AKA authentication process, the anchor key can be obtained, thereby deriving various subsequent protection keys, threatening the security of the 5G network and causing user information leakage . [0004] According to the...

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Problems solved by technology

[0005](1) When UDM / ARFP sends authentication vector 5G HE AV to AUSF, there is no security protection, because 5G HE AV contains expected response value XRES* and key Kausf , where XRES* will be used for user identity authentication. Once leaked, it will cause problems such as attackers fraudulently using user authentication information to access the network; the key Kausf will be used to derive Kseaf and subsequent encryption protection between users and the core network. Integrity protection and other related keys. Once the key is attacked or leaked, it will pose a security threat to the data transmission between the user and the core network, resulting in the theft or tampering of user data.

[0006](2) During 5G AKA authentication, AUSF did not carry out security protection when sending Kseaf to SEAF, because Kseaf will also be used to deduce the relationship between subsequent users and the core network Encryption protection and integrity protection and other related keys, once the key is attacked or leaked, it will pose a security threat to the data transmission between the user and the core network, resulting in the theft or tampering of user data

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