Utilizing cash flow contracts and physical collateral for energy-related clearing and credit enhancement platforms

Abstract

In accordance with the present invention, a financial instrument for the energy market is created. The financial instrument comprises a derivative instrument related to accounts receivable or accounts payable or both. In a preferred embodiment, the derivative instrument normally consists of two sets of linked swaps. In the first set, the seller exchanges two things with a third party: (i) the right for payment of accounts receivable within a month from the buyer is exchanged for the right to payment of such accounts receivable within a week from the third party; and (ii) the obligation to deliver energy to the buyer is exchanged for the obligation to deliver to the third party. The buyer exchanges the mirror image of those with a third party, to wit: (i) the obligation to pay within a month to the seller is exchanged for the obligation to pay within a week to the third party, but the buyer receives financing to offset the cash flow ramifications; and (ii) the obligation to take delivery from the seller is exchanged with the obligation to take delivery from the third party. The swap can further be utilized to net payment obligations under multiple cash and forward commodity transactions between the buyer and the seller. Physical collateral is utilized as margin. In accordance with another aspect of the present invention, the process takes place on a ‘clearing platform’ for such energy transactions.

Description

FIELD OF THE INVENTION [0001] The present invention relates to energy contracts. BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION [0002] Energy markets need a more effective credit management and clearing solution to address the structural problems in the marketplace and satisfy more stringent regulatory oversight. Many bilateral energy transactions are over-collateralized. Liquidity for forward contracts, a type of commercial merchandizing transaction, is dropping. Trading activity is shifting from forward contract markets to the spot markets due to differences in collateral practices. This shift puts greater credit risks on physical market participants operating within an area coordinated by an independent transmission provider (ITP) or a gas pipeline. Also, due to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, participants must fully disclose all material risks including potential credit exposures and valuations of open forward-market positions. [0003] The federal regulatory agency responsible for overseeing energy...

AI Technical Summary

Benefits of technology

[0018] A clearing platform for energy markets in accordance with the principles of the present invention reduces credit and default risk, reduces cash collateral requirements, reduces net energy costs while avoiding cost impacts on net buyers, insulates system reliability operations from financial distress, restores liquidity to the forward market segment of the cash market, and should result in reduced energy costs to consumers.

Problems solved by technology

This shift puts greater credit risks on physical market participants operating within an area coordinated by an independent transmission provider (ITP) or a gas pipeline.

There is no single cash marketplace for energy.

The delayed payment cycle under cash contracts creates a post-delivery credit risk for the seller that the power purchaser may default on its obligation to pay for electricity it has already received and used.

The increased gas collateral requirement combined with the delayed payment cycle for sales of electricity create greater cash flow challenges for the power producer / seller.

Increasing volumes transacted through cash markets create a credit risk cycle.

Credit downgrades increase the probability of counterparty default and increase the risk that, during a default event, replacement of non-delivered commodity would occur during periods of high prices due to market scarcity or uncertainty.

The ITPs are not as responsive in adjusting their credit policies and practices due to the time consuming and uncertain process of obtaining stakeholder consensus and regulatory approvals.

While participants may know the percentage of loss that would be allocated to them in the event of a default, they do not know the amount of potential exposure.

Investigations by the FERC and the CFTC have identified instances of alleged false and fraudulent reporting of prices to the independent surveyors.

As less trade volume occurs in the forward market and the tenor of trade activity decreases, the ability to accurately mark-to-market and report true value of open commodity positions in financial statements becomes increasingly difficult.

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