Financial POS system against channel Trojan horse attack and its anti-attack implementation method

Abstract

Disclosed are a financial POS system capable of resisting a channel Trojan attack and an anti-attack implementation method thereof. The system comprises a POS mainboard, an IC card box, a password keyboard, a user PIN disk, a nonvolatile memory, an IC card, and a trust management party. The IC card box is connected to the POS mainboard, the password keyboard is connected to the IC card box, the POS mainboard is connected to the trust management party through an I / O interface, and the IC card is connected to the trust management party through the IC card box. In the present invention, under a condition that a subliminal channel can be reliably shielded on a POS terminal of a dealer and a card holder uses a private user PIN disk to confirm a transaction amount and input a PIN password, the dealer and the card holder can avoid the attack of the channel Trojan.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention relates to the application field of a cryptographic chip used for confidentiality and authentication in information security, in particular to a financial POS system against channel Trojan attacks and an anti-attack implementation method. Background technique [0002] IC cards with cryptographic chips as the core have been widely used in various fields such as finance, telecommunications, transportation, public utilities, government departments, national defense and the military. EMV is a bank IC card specification jointly formulated by the three major international bank card organizations Europay, MasterCard, and VISA. EMV migration refers to the transfer of bank cards from magnetic stripe cards to integrated circuit (IC) cards. The purpose of EMV migration is to replace magnetic stripe cards with IC cards to prevent financial crimes such as making and using fake credit cards, credit card fraud, and transnational financial fraud. [000...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

However, in the attack examples 2 and 3 above, the cardholder was attacked without fault. When the attack example 1 and attack example 4 are added, the existing bank card system cannot distinguish who should bear the responsibility.

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