An Extensible RFID Two-way Authentication Method

Abstract

The present invention discloses an extensible RFID bidirectional authentication method, including: a reader generates a random number r with the length of L, calculates A in combination with an identifier UID, and sends A and request Query to a tag; the tag calculates the random number r through A, calculates two authenticity verification values B and C using r and (K, ID) stored therein and sends same to the reader; the reader receives B and C and sends same to a background database together with r; the background database calculates odd digit Bn of B and then matches same with values in an even bit library of a shared key, to quickly retrieve corresponding (K, ID), and calculates B' and C' to verify tag authenticity; and if the tag is valid, the background database calculates to obtain an authenticity verification value D by using the current key K and the random number r, sends D to the reader, and updates the key K; the reader receives D and sends same to the tag, and the tag receives same and calculates D' to verify the reader for authenticity; and if the reader is valid, the tag updates the key K.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention relates to the field of radio frequency identification (RFID) research, in particular to an expandable RFID bidirectional authentication method in an RFID system. Background technique [0002] Radio frequency identification (radio frequency identification, RFID) is a key technology of the Internet of Things, usually composed of three parts: background database, reader and tag. The reader sends and receives signals to the tag through the antenna, automatically identifies the target object and obtains relevant information data, and transmits the information data to the background database for further processing. RFID provides contactless, instant identification of objects and objects. As a high-tech that collects and processes information quickly and accurately, and has the advantages of non-contact, wear resistance, low cost, small size, and long life, it is widely used in supply chain management, inventory monitoring, transportation, ele...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

At the same time, the reader must first confirm the identity of the tag before using the private information of the tag to verify the legitimacy of the message. This requires the background database to try to decrypt the key information of all tags, which means that the cost of confirming the tag is linearly related to the number of tags. , when the number of labels is too large, it is determined that the label cost is too large

The scheme proposed by Sarma S E and others (Sarma S E, Weis S A, Engels D W.RFIDsystems and security and privacy implications[G] / / LNCS 2523:Proc of the 4thInt Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems(CHES2002).Berlin:Springer ,2003:454-469) Since the ID does not use a dynamic refresh mechanism, the metalID remains unchanged, the tag is easy to be tracked and located, and (key, ID) is sent in plain text, which is easy to be obtained by eavesdroppers; the scheme proposed by Ohkubo M et al. (Ohkubo M, Suzuki K, Kinoshita S. Hash-chain based forward-secure privacy protection scheme for low-cost RFID[C] / / Proc of the Symp on Cryptography and Information Security. Los Alamitors, CA: IEEE Computer Society, 2004:719 -724) is only a one-way authentication protocol, and the protocol is very vulnerable to retransmission and counterfeit attacks; the scheme proposed by Lee S M and others (LEE SM, HWANG Y J, LEE D H, et al.Efficient authentication for low-cost RFID systems[ A]. Proceedings of International Conference on Computational Science and Its Applications [C]. 2005.619-627) Since the request information is processed each time, denial of service attacks cannot be prevented; the scheme proposed by Wang Shaohui and others (Wang Shaohui, Liu Sujuan, Chen Danwei. Scalable RFID two-way authentication scheme that satisfies backward privacy [J]. Computer Research and Development, 2013, 06:1276-1284.) The random numbers r1 and r2 generated by the tag and the reader are transmitted in plain text, and the hash function algorithm They are all public, and the attacker can crack the key value by exhaustive methods; the scheme proposed by Jin Yongming et al. (Jin Yongming, Wu Qiying, Shi Zhiqiang, Lu Xiang, Sun Limin. Research on RFID Lightweight Authentication Protocol Based on PRF [J]. Computer Research and Development, 2014,07:1506-1514) relatively high security , but in this scheme, the tag generates random numbers, which increases the cost of the tag. In addition, the protocol needs to traverse to confirm the identity of the tag, which makes the calculation of the background database large, and the scalability is not strong; the scheme proposed by Alomair B et al. (Alomair B, Cuellar J, PoovendranR..Scalable RFID systems: A privacy-preserving protocol with constant timeidentification[J].IEEE Trans on Parallel and Distributed Systems, 2012,23(8):1-10) and the scheme proposed by Godor G et al. (Godor G, Imre S. Hash-based mutual authentication protocol for low-cost RFID systems[C] / / Proc of the 18th EUNICE Conf on Information and Communications Technologies. Berlin: Springer, 2012: 76-87.) Although it is solved by using pseudonyms Scalability problem, but the scheme proposed by Alomair B et al. cannot provide backward privacy security, and the scheme proposed by Godor G et al. cannot resist asynchronous attacks. The attacker makes the stored information in the tag and reader by replaying and forging messages Inconsistent key data, thus breaking subsequent authentication of tags and readers

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