Method of identifying user identity by digital certificate based on separating mapping network
A digital certificate and user identity technology, applied in the network field, can solve problems such as host identity and host identifier not forming an effective binding, unable to confirm the identity information of the other party, and potential safety hazards, so as to standardize user network behavior and realize network security. Management function, good management effect
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Embodiment 1
[0089] Embodiment 1: In this embodiment, the method of the present invention uses a digital certificate digest to construct a 128-bit access address to realize the separation of user identity and location.
[0090] Among them, the routing address of the access router uses a 128-bit IPv6 address. According to the address separation mapping network routing address allocation method, this embodiment assigns the routing address to the access router in an address aggregation manner according to the network topology. The access router has a certain A large number of routing addresses are used by the access terminal to facilitate terminal location management and data packet routing and forwarding; according to the IP address, the location management of the current domain of the access terminal can be realized, and the intermediate router can directly implement routing and forwarding based on the IP address without considering the identity issue.
[0091] The access address of the acce...
Embodiment 2
[0093] Embodiment 2: The network topology structure diagram of the network topology that realizes the real identity confirmation of the access terminal introduced in the address separation mapping network is as follows Figure 5 as shown, Figure 5 The schematic diagram of the process of authenticating terminal A by access router AR1 is as follows: Figure 6 shown.
[0094] exist Figure 6 Among them, in data packet P, N1 is the pseudo-random number generated by terminal A for this session; in data packet V, N1 is the pseudo-random number in P; N2 is the pseudo-random number generated by the access router in this session ; D-H is the initial parameter of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange; iface is the identification of the packet P arriving at the AR1 interface; HMAC rs is the message authentication code of N2, D-H, iface and other domains; rs is the password for accessing the route, which is cycled every minute.
[0095] In the data packet M, {Cert_1} represents the cipher...
Embodiment 3
[0107] Embodiment 3: The process of mutual confirmation of the real identities of both terminal A and terminal B introduced in the address separation mapping network by the present invention is as follows: Figure 7 shown.
[0108] exist Figure 7 In the data packet P', N4 is the pseudo-random number generated by terminal A for this session; in the data packet V', N4 is the pseudo-random number in P'; N5 is the pseudo-random number generated by terminal B in this session Pseudo-random number; D-H' is the initial parameter of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange; iface' is the identification of the data packet P arriving at the terminal B interface; HMAC rs‘ is the message authentication code of N5, D-H', iface' and other domains; rs' is the password of terminal B, which is cycled every minute.
[0109] In the data packet M', {Cert_1} represents the ciphertext of the digital certificate of the terminal A, and the encryption key is the session key obtained by calculating the Diffi...
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