Complete passive cooling system for post-accident reactor cores of large PWR (pressurized water reactor) nuclear power plants

Abstract

A completely passive cooling system for a post-incident reactor core of a large-scale pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant, comprising a shielded plant (4), a water tank (5), a cooling water distribution plate (8), a sprinkler water pipe (6), and an air deflector panel (9). A chimney (7) is arranged on the top part of the steel-concrete composite structured shielded plant (4). The water tank (5) is arranged above the shielded plant (4) and around the chimney (7). The cooling water distribution plate (8) is arranged above the top part of a safety housing (3) within the shielded plant (4). The sprinkler water pipe (6) is arranged on the inside of the top part of the shielded plant (4). A water inlet-end of the sprinkler water pipe (6) is connected to the bottom part of the water tank (5). A water outlet-end of the sprinkler water pipe (6) is extended above the cooling water distribution plate (8). A through air inlet (13) is provided on the top part of an outer wall of the shielded plant (4). The air deflector panel (9) is arranged between the shielded plant (4) and the safety housing (3). The upper end of the air deflector panel (9) is connected to the inside of the top part of the shielded plant (4). A double-layered top part is formed on the upper end of the cylindrical shielded plant (4), while a cylindrical air flow passage (16) is formed on the top part, where the double-layered steel-concrete top part constitutes the water tank (5). The cooling system employs the integrated modular design of the shielded plant (4) and the water tank (5), and enlarges the volume of the water tank (5), thus implementing long-term completely passive discharge of reactor core residual heat.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention relates to the field of dedicated safety systems for pressurized water reactor nuclear power plants, in particular to a completely passive cooling system for cores after accidents in large pressurized water reactor nuclear power plants. Background technique [0002] On March 11, 2011, a nuclear accident that shocked the world occurred in Fukushima, Japan. One of the main reasons for the nuclear accident was that under the super design basis accident of the earthquake and tsunami, the GE company owned by Fukushima produced The Mark I unit could not realize the effective discharge of waste heat from the core, which eventually caused the core to melt and produce a large amount of hydrogen, which indirectly caused the overpressure of the containment. After the Fukushima incident, nuclear power safety agencies and industry have a stronger demand for long-term passive cooling capacity of nuclear power plants. The Japan Atomic Energy Associatio...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

[0002] On March 11, 2011, a nuclear accident that shocked the world occurred in Fukushima, Japan. One of the main reasons for the nuclear accident was that under the super design basis accident of the earthquake and tsunami, the GE company owned by Fukushima produced The Mark I unit could not realize the effective removal of waste heat from the core, which eventually caused the core to melt and produce a large amount of hydrogen, which indirectly caused the overpressure of the containment vessel. At the same time, due to forced penetration of seawater for cooling, a large amount of radioactive substances leaked out.

However, after 72 hours, AP1000 still needs an external power supply, or helicopters, fire trucks and other devices to assist in the discharge of waste heat, so AP1000 is not completely passive.

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