Detection method aiming at CPU internal hidden instruction type hardware trojan

A hardware Trojan and detection method technology, applied in the fields of instruments, electrical digital data processing, platform integrity maintenance, etc., can solve the problems of small change range, small scale, difficult to determine, etc., to achieve high accuracy, fast and effective detection and testing The effect of reducing the number of

Active Publication Date: 2015-08-26
58TH RES INST OF CETC
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AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

The biggest advantage of hardware Trojan detection based on bypass analysis of the circuit is that the hardware Trojan can be detected without being triggered. The scale of the implanted hardware Trojan is very small, and some bypass information, such as current and path delay, have very small changes
Considering the noise introduced in the measurement process and the noise caused by process drift in the chip manufacturing process, this extremely small bypass signal change will not be actually measured or even if it is measured, it is difficult to determine whether it is caused by a hardware Trojan , or due to measurement noise, process drift noise
[0004] However, the research on whether there are hidden instructions in the CPU, SoC and other circuits is basically blank.
And because this type of hidden instruction type hardware Trojan horse needs to be triggered by software control, because the traditional techniques such as detection based on bypass analysis cannot be applied to the detection of this type of hardware Trojan horse, so a new detection method is required to specifically deal with CPU internal Detection of hardware Trojans with hidden instructions

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  • Detection method aiming at CPU internal hidden instruction type hardware trojan
  • Detection method aiming at CPU internal hidden instruction type hardware trojan
  • Detection method aiming at CPU internal hidden instruction type hardware trojan

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Embodiment Construction

[0026] The present invention will be further described below in conjunction with specific drawings and embodiments.

[0027] In the current CPU system, instructions are an important component, and various operations of the user on the CPU are completed through instructions. Since the most popular CPU architectures such as Intel X86, MIPS, ARM, etc., their instruction sets are developed by foreign companies, there is no way to know whether there are hidden instructions that are not in the instruction list, and they lack corresponding detection methods to identify their circuits. Or whether there is a backdoor function triggered by hidden commands in the IP. Once it has hidden instructions and is known to the attacker, the attacker can use these hidden instructions to gain control of the chip to complete the attack on the circuit or system.

[0028] Based on the above situation, the present invention provides a detection method specifically aimed at the hidden instructions that may ...

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Abstract

The invention provides a detection method aiming at a CPU internal hidden instruction type hardware trojan. The detection method comprises the following steps: firstly dividing a machine code of a CPU instruction into an operating code segment and an operating number segment, re-dividing the operation number segment into N segments according to characteristics of different CPU frameworks; secondly, for the N divided operation number segments, extracting one sample from each segment according to a certain rule to form a complete instruction with the operation codes; and then, traversing the operation code segment, simply and randomly sampling the operation number segment to form a to-be-tested instruction sample set; finally testing all instructions in the to-be-tested instruction sample set to judge whether the hidden instruction type hardware Trojan is existent in the CPU. Compared with the traditional full-traversing method, the testing time of the method provided by the invention is greatly reduced, and the hidden instruction type Trojan can be fast and effectively detected.

Description

Technical field [0001] The present invention relates to a detection method for hidden instruction type hardware Trojan horse inside CPU, mainly for SOC core IP provided by a third party and SOC chip using third-party imported core. Background technique [0002] In recent years, the "Snowden Prism Gate", "Iran Stuxnet" and "Libya and Syrian Wars" incidents have shown that hardware Trojan horses in integrated circuits can be used as a weapon for information warfare, cyber warfare, and even physical destruction of the military. Equipment and key facilities seriously threaten national security. Therefore, effective measures are taken to effectively identify the hardware Trojans in the integrated circuits and ensure the safety and credibility of the integrated circuits. [0003] The researches on hardware Trojan detection at home and abroad are all pure hardware Trojan detection methods. At present, there are mainly four categories: destructive detection, system operation detection, lo...

Claims

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Application Information

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Patent Type & Authority Applications(China)
IPC IPC(8): G06F21/56
CPCG06F21/562
Inventor 张荣周昱包小钰魏敬和于宗光徐静
Owner 58TH RES INST OF CETC
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