Method and apparatus for identifying and verifying RFID privacy protection

Abstract

The invention discloses a method and an apparatus for identifying and verifying RFID privacy protection. Attacks of illegal reader scanning and position tracking are resisted by mutual authentication between an RFID tag and an RFID reader, and one-way hash function H(x) and exclusive-or operation are introduced in the authentication of the RFID tag and the RFID reader; a pseudo-random number generating module and a one-way hash function module are introduced in the RFID tag, the pseudo-random number generating module and the one-way hash function module are also introduced in the RFID reader, a background server stores an ID of the RFID tag, and a shared ciphertext Kr is also stored in the RFID tag and the RFID reader. According to the invention, the tag, the reader and a background database carry out mutual authentication successively and independently, which not only realizes a bidirectional authentication, but also realizes a two-level authentication carried out by the reader and the background database on the tag. A bidirectional two-level authentication between the tag and the reader in an RFID system is realized; various security threats faced by the RFID system can be comprehensively and effectively prevented or reduced, and especially attacks such as illegal reader scanning, position tracking and the like are comprehensively resisted.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention relates to the field of RFID security, in particular to an RFID privacy protection identification verification method and a device thereof. Background technique [0002] At present, RFID technology has been widely used in many fields, such as: military, logistics and supply management, aviation baggage handling, sports game timing, building access control, electronic tickets, contactless credit cards, automatic road toll collection, animal identification, etc. These applications usually have high requirements for private information such as the location of RFID, and it is necessary to ensure the security and privacy of RFID. [0003] Taking an attack where an attacker deploys an illegal monitor to monitor location privacy as an example, the attacker can deploy illegal RFID readers in key locations such as streets and intersections in advance in areas to be monitored. In the process of the RFID tag carrier passing through the monitoring a...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

The weakness of this protocol lies in: during the authentication period with the legal reader, the output value of the tag is static, and the tag is easy to be tracked at this time; in addition, there is also the problem of out-of-sync update of the database and the tag, which will suffer a denial of service attack

[0008] In addition, Karthikeyan and others proposed a series of protocols that only need XOR, random number generator, cyclic redundancy check and other simple operations, and the amount of calculation is greatly reduced, but Pedro and others pointed out that there are illegal reader-writer scanning and Hidden dangers of privacy leakage caused by illegal location tracking, etc., cannot protect private information such as tag location very well

Images