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Hardware Trojan detection system and method based on multi-parameter side channel analysis

A technology of hardware Trojan detection and side channel analysis, which is applied in electrical digital data processing, internal/peripheral computer component protection, instruments, etc., can solve the problems of unfeasible test methods and large amount of calculation, etc., to reduce background current and improve detection Sensitivity, the effect of improving the signal-to-noise ratio

Inactive Publication Date: 2018-10-19
SOUTHEAST UNIV
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  • Summary
  • Abstract
  • Description
  • Claims
  • Application Information

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

The main challenge of the logic-test-based approach is that during the testing of very large hardware Trojans, complete enumeration and test generation would generate a huge amount of computation, making this testing approach infeasible

Method used

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  • Hardware Trojan detection system and method based on multi-parameter side channel analysis
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  • Hardware Trojan detection system and method based on multi-parameter side channel analysis

Examples

Experimental program
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Effect test

Embodiment 1

[0055] Embodiment one: the hardware trojan is placed in the controllable module 3 of the 32-bit ALU circuit, such as Figure 7 shown. The hardware Trojan can be detected when module 3 is activated, that is, during the period from 2ns to 4ns. During this period, other controllable modules (module 2 and module 4) are disconnected, thereby reducing the static power consumption by 50%, and weakening the process noise generated by the circuit. In this case, deactivating other modules will make the change of the transient current due to the insertion of the hardware Trojan more obvious. It can be shown from the above that using this method so that only one module is activated each time (except module 1) can increase the sensitivity of Trojan horse detection.

Embodiment 2

[0056] Embodiment 2: The hardware Trojan horse is placed in the active module 1 of the 32-bit ALU circuit. Since module 1 is always active, its transient current can only be detected when all controllable modules are deactivated, in this embodiment before or after 6 ns of the external signal to the SC. The hardware Trojan horse system of detection module 1 is established as Figure 8 As shown, TD is "high" and SC is "low" to inactivate all other controllable modules. If there is a hardware Trojan in this block, it will be easily detected, because the static power consumption of the circuit (the other 3 modules are deactivated) is reduced by 75%, and the process noise generated by the circuit is significantly reduced, making the noise caused by the hardware Trojan Transient current changes are very noticeable.

Embodiment 3

[0057] Embodiment 3: Even if there is a hardware Trojan among different modules, the present invention can effectively detect the Trojan. Such as Figure 9 As shown, here, it is assumed that both module 2 and module 3 have hardware Trojans, which can be detected by activating these modules individually. First, module 2 is activated by giving pulse excitation at SC1, after which the transient current of module 2 can be detected. Then, module 3 is activated by SC2 after a buffer delay, after which the transient current of module 3 can be detected. The transient current change of the circuit under the superimposition of two hardware Trojan horses is very obvious.

[0058] The above examples all illustrate that the present invention can amplify the influence of the hardware Trojan horse on the transient current of the circuit. Thus the average transient current I of the IC chip is obtained DDT , with the average transient current I DDT value and maximum operating frequency f ...

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Abstract

The invention discloses a hardware Trojan detection system based on multi-parameter side channel analysis. The system comprises an acquisition module and a detection module. The invention also discloses a hardware Trojan detection method based on the multi-parameter side channel analysis. The method comprises the following steps that: independently carrying out a time delay test on an original chip group and a chip group to be tested to obtain maximum working frequency fmax during normal work; carrying out module division, applying a test vector group to obtain the transient current of all modules, obtaining the average transient current IDDT of each chip, and drawing an IDDT-fmax graph; and comparing the IDDT value of chip to be tested and the IDDT value of an original chip under the samefmax, and checking whether the IDDT value of the chip to be tested exceeds a threshold value line or not to judge whether the chip to be tested contains Trojan or not. By use of the technical scheme,various parameters, including maximum working frequency, transient current and the like, are used to improve the resolution of Trojan detection.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention belongs to the technical field of integrated circuit detection, and in particular relates to a hardware Trojan horse detection system and detection method based on multi-parameter side channel analysis, which is especially suitable for the detection of complex Trojan horses in complex processes. Background technique [0002] For integrated circuit (IC) chips used in security-sensitive systems such as avionics, finance, and transportation, special attention needs to be paid to their reliability, security, and credibility. However, the globalization trend of the integrated circuit industry separates the design of IC chips from the manufacturing process, resulting in risks in the outsourcing manufacturing process of IC chips: Some untrustworthy manufacturers may change the original design of IC chips (such as modifying the mask board) , Embedding so-called hardware Trojan horse circuits; these circuits can be activated under specific trigger...

Claims

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Application Information

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IPC IPC(8): G06F21/55G06F21/71
CPCG06F21/554G06F21/71
Inventor 李冰黄琰玲梅灵陈佳旭刘勇沈克强董乾张林王刚赵霞
Owner SOUTHEAST UNIV
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