Wireless network lightweight class authentication key negotiation protocol based on digital certificate

Abstract

The invention relates to a wireless network lightweight class authentication key negotiation protocol based on a digital certificate. A user identity is subjected to dual authentication through a 'certificate private key and protection key' dual authentication system and a 'protection key' dynamic negotiation mechanism by sharing a dynamic protection key according to a public key password; a user proves the session holdness and the private key owning property by exchanging the certificate according to a private key signature, so that primary authentication is executed; and due to protection key sharing, secondary authentication is executed. Important parameters are protected by two parties through the protection key after the last session is finished; the correctness of the key is confirmed through a new protection key calculated at the session; during each communication, when the parameters are exchanged, the correctness can be checked. Negotiation for key groups and parameter exchange adopt simple bit computation; and the key updating is confirmed by Finished messages. According to the protocol, a dynamic ID is set to dynamically select whether the shared old parameters are used for calculating the key of the session; and safety and high efficiency are guaranteed, and the flexibility of the protocol is improved.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention relates to a lightweight authentication key negotiation protocol applicable to wireless Internet, which utilizes a "certificate private key-protection key" dual authentication system and a "protection key" dynamic negotiation mechanism, and adopts a new and old protection key phase The combined method protects the exchange of important parameters, the operation of the session key uses ultra-lightweight operators, and finally combines the BAN logic and informal analysis methods to analyze the security of the protocol, proving that it can reach the first-level belief and the second-level Faith also has security properties such as two-way entity authentication and perfect forward secrecy. This protocol only needs two communications to complete the parameter exchange in the key negotiation phase. The calculation of the session key group uses bit operations with a small amount of calculation, which has the characteristics of efficient transmissi...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

Famous protocols such as the Needham-Schroeder protocol, Woo-Lam protocol, Denning-Sacco protocol, and Fiat-Shamir authentication protocol proposed in the early days were later found to be insecure under replay attacks or known key attacks

In 2002, Kim et al. (Kim M, Kim K.A New Identification Scheme Based on the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Group[C].In Information security and privacy: 7th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2002 Melbourne. Australia, July 3-5, 2002: 362-378.) An authentication protocol is proposed based on the difficulty of BDHP, but the interaction process of the protocol is complicated and there are security holes

In 2003, China launched its own national standard for wireless LAN GB 15629.11 (Information technology-Telecommunications and information exchange between systems-Local and metropolitan area networks-Specific requirements-Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications.GB 15629.11-2003.(in Chinese)), the standard includes wireless authentication and confidentiality infrastructure WAPI mechanism, but the protocol lacks private key verification in the authentication link, and the key negotiation link does not have security attributes such as forward security. Resists attacks such as replay attacks and key asynchronization

In 2004, the IEEE standard approved the 802.11i security specification (IEEE P802.11i / D3.0, Specification for Enhanced Security[OL], http: / / standards.ieee.org / reading / ieee / std / lanman / rafts / P802. 11i.pdf), since the "EAP-Success" message sent by the AP is transmitted in plain text, it is easy to be forged by an attacker to carry out a man-in-the-middle attack

In the same year, PoPescu (Popescu, C.A secure authenticated key agreement protocol. Electrotechnical Conference, 2004. MELECON 2004. Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Mediterranean. 12-15 May 2004(2): 783-786.) proposed an authenticated key agreement protocol , the security and execution efficiency of the protocol are good, but because the confirmation of the parameters is completely dependent on the long-term shared key of the protocol participants, it does not have key leakage security

In 2005, Sui et al. (Sui A, Hui L, Yiu S, Chow K, Tsang W, Chong C, et al. An improved authenticated key agreement protocol with perfect forward secrecy for wireless mobile communication. In IEEE wireless and communications and networking conference (WCNC 2005), 2005: 2088-93.) proposed a password-based elliptic curve authentication protocol. Although the protocol has a small computational overhead, it cannot resist offline password brute force attacks

2007. Feng et al. (Feng Dengguo, Chen Weidong. Modular design and analysis of password-based security protocols [J]. Chinese Science Series E, 2007, 37(2): 223-237.) proposed a password-based modularization Authentication protocol, but because the protocol has a large communication and computing overhead, it is not suitable for wireless Internet networks

In 2012, Jonathan et al. (Jonathan Katz, Philip MacKenzie, Gelareh Taban, Virgil Gligor. Two-server password-only authenticated key exchange[J]. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, March 2012, 78(2): 651-669 ) designed a two-server authenticated key agreement protocol, but the above protocols are not suitable for wireless networks due to their excessive communication calculation overhead or insufficient anti-attack capabilities

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