A Lightweight RFID Bidirectional Authentication Method Based on Time Factor Anti-Desynchronization

Abstract

The embodiment of the invention provides a lightweight RFID mutual authentication method based on time factors against desynchronization. The method comprises the following steps: mutual verification between a label and a reader-writer is realized in a way that a back-end database and the label share old and new secret keys, randomized numbers and time factors are adopted as fresh quantities and encryption calculating is conducted, the randomized numbers are generated by the back-end database each time, the time factors are stored and updated by the label, and Hash operation and cyclic shift calculation are conducted during each verification process between the back-end database and the label according to stored secret key information. The method has good security and privacy protection performance, can well resist desynchronization attacks from attackers, can protect content privacy, position privacy and forward and backward security, and can resist playback attacks, eavesdropping and other attacks.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention relates to a lightweight RFID bidirectional authentication method based on time factor anti-desynchronization, and belongs to the technical field of RFID communication security. Use the "one-way random number-new and old key pair" double authentication mechanism to realize the two-way challenge-response of the background database-label system, and use the timely updated time factor to ensure the trustworthiness and real-time performance of the protocol's freshness. The operation of update and authentication parameters uses lightweight hash function and ultra-lightweight cyclic shift function, and finally combines the formal proof method and informal method of BAN logic to analyze the privacy and security of the protocol, proving that this method can achieve The state space is expected, and it can effectively resist attacks such as location tracking attacks and desynchronization. This method only needs four communications to complete the au...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

In 2007, Chien HY worked on ultra-lightweight SASI authentication protocol (H Y Chien. SASI: A new ultralightweight RFID authentication protocol providing strong authentication and strong integrity [J]. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 2007, 4(9): 337-340 ) only uses a limited number of ultra-lightweight algorithms such as XOR (exclusive OR), Rot (x, y) cyclic shift to achieve challenge-response, and establishes two key storage units in the background database to improve key recovery. capability, but due to the algebraic nature of the ROT function, SASI is proven to be susceptible to bit tampering (Dimitriou, T. (2005). ALightweight RFID Protocol to protect against Traceability and Cloning attacks[C] / / Proceedings of First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks (SecureComm 2005), Athens, Greece, ISBN: 0769523692) Desynchronization Attack

The protocol designed by Peris Lopez relies entirely on the reader PRNG (pseudo-random number generator) to provide freshness, which saves the computational overhead of tags, but the protocol is also vulnerable to desynchronization attacks (LiT Wang. Security analysis of two ultra-lightweight RFID authenticationprotocols[C] / / Proceedings of the IFIP TC-11 22 nd International Information Security Conference IFIP SEC 2007. South Africa: 2007: 109-120) and algebraic attacks (Gidas Avoine, Xavier Carpent. Strong Authentication and Strong Integrity (SASI) Is Not That Strong[C] / / The 6 th International Workshop.RFIDSec 2010.Turkey: Istanbul, 2010, 50-64)

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