261results about "Circuit security details" patented technology

A video system for providing a large number of video streams. The video system includes a video server and dividing means. Storage means, a switch and control means are located at the video server. The video server has a plurality of central-processing units (CPUs). The dividing means divides a plurality of input video-streams entering the video system, and sends the divided plurality of input-video streams, with each divided video stream identified with a separate Ethernet address, to the video server. The storage means stores an input video-stream of the plurality of input video-streams as a stored-video stream. The switch routes an input-video stream of the plurality of input-video streams to the storage means. The control means controls the storage means to replay the stored-video stream and to control portions of the stored-video stream at an appropriate time, and controls the plurality of CPUs at the video server to work in parallel.

A physical barrier for a circuit board also functions as a tampering sensor or sensors monitored by electrical circuitry that generates a tamper signal for erasing information critical for the operation of the circuit board in the event of sensed tampering. One or more routing matrices configured in at least one programmable device is programmed to interconnect operating as well as optional dummy components on the board so that routing information is erased in the event of sensed tampering.

A tamper respondent module includes a basecard adapted to be inserted into a slot in a rack enclosure comprising at least one guide edge, at least one electrical coupler, a surface and at least one electronic component that contains information in an electronic format. In one example, an outer cover is coupled to the basecard and includes at least five sides. The outer cover is arranged in a covering relationship over the at least one electronic component. In another example, an anti-tamper apparatus is disposed between the outer cover and the surface. In another example, an anti-tamper circuit is electrically coupled to the at least one electronic component. In another example, a thermal frame is thermally coupled to the at least one electronic component.

The invention is based on use of a heat-activated adhesive for manufacturing of intelligent devices comprising printed conductive electronics on a flexible substrate, where the adhesive is an anisotropic electrically conductive adhesive and is applied to the substrate as a thin film which can be used for electrical connections and for providing mechanical stability to the printed conductive electronics.

A structure and method for forming a tamper respondent electronic circuit enclosure that includes an integrated circuit structure, a mesh structure surrounding the integrated circuit structure, and a sealed enclosure surrounding the mesh structure. The mesh structure includes a layer of flexible dielectric having a first side and a second side, a screen-printed pattern of flexible electrically conductive first circuit lines forming a first resistor network on the first side, and a photo lithographically-formed pattern of flexible electrically conductive second circuit lines forming a second resistor network on the second side.

A noncontact IC card is provided with an antenna coil, an IC chip and a short-circuiting circuit formed on a base card. The noncontact IC card is kept inoperative unless the short-circuiting circuit is opened and the noncontact IC card is rendered operative when the short-circuiting circuit is opened. The short-circuiting circuit is formed to extend across a main part and a removable identification part included in the base card. The short-circuiting circuit can be opened by removing the identification part from the base card.

A construction arrangement for a small set-top box to protect cryptographic capabilities and prevent a digital program in clear from being able to be tapped as required by Digital Rights Management protocols. A first layer of sheet metal capable of blocking X-rays, is formed as a shallow pan to hold a set of printed circuit boards. A second layer has a thin epoxy based printed circuit material. A third layer has a printed circuit board with integrated components placed on top of the second layer. A fourth layer has a three layer thin printed circuit board with a first and second metallic layer and holes for large components, such as electrolytic capacitors. A black liquid thermosetting epoxy fills the interstices between the sheet metal layer and the second layer, and between the second layer and the third layer, and between the third layer and the fourth layer, thereby preventing access to exposed circuit trace carrying digital signals in the clear. A connection from the first metallic layer of the fourth printed circuit material layer to a sending circuit and a connection from the second metallic layer so that a short between these two layers sets off an indicator circuit that an attempt is made to enter the protected area.

A tamper-proof cap adapted to be mounted on a large assembly for shielding a selected area of the large assembly is disclosed. The tamper-proof cap comprises a laminate stack-up structure wherein at least one open chamber is formed. The stack-up structure comprises at least two layers wherein tamper-proof layers are formed on top of the open chamber. A plurality of vias are disposed around the open chamber, forming with said tamper proof layers a tamper-proof structure around said open chamber. The vias are adapted for connecting the tamper-proof layers to the large assembly when the tamper-proof cap is mounted. In a preferred embodiment, the tamper-proof cap further comprises a shielding layer on top of the tamper-proof layer that are preferably done using conductive ink.

A tamper respondent module includes a basecard adapted to be inserted into a slot in a rack enclosure comprising at least one guide edge, at least one electrical coupler, a surface and at least one electronic component that contains information in an electronic format. In one example, an outer cover is coupled to the basecard and includes at least five sides. The outer cover is arranged in a covering relationship over the at least one electronic component. In another example, an anti-tamper apparatus is disposed between the outer cover and the surface. In another example, an anti-tamper circuit is electrically coupled to the at least one electronic component. In another example, a thermal frame is thermally coupled to the at least one electronic component.

A method and device for data security including a printed circuit board and an integrated circuit each having a conductive trace layer shielded by a electrical shield layer. Tampering with either side of the device causes disturbance of a current flowing through a conductive trace layer used as an electrical shield. This triggers a security circuit to erase the data stored in the integrated circuit and stop data flow between the printed circuit board and the integrated circuit.

The invention provides transient devices, including active and passive devices that physically, chemically and / or electrically transform upon application of at least one internal and / or external stimulus. Incorporation of degradable device components, degradable substrates and / or degradable encapsulating materials each having a programmable, controllable and / or selectable degradation rate provides a means of transforming the device. In some embodiments, for example, transient devices of the invention combine degradable high performance single crystalline inorganic materials with selectively removable substrates and / or encapsulants.

A tamper protected printed circuit board assembly including a printed circuit board and a tamper wrap attached to the printed circuit board. The tamper wrap includes a plurality of side tabs extending from a main body portion and a plurality of corner protection flaps extending from the side tabs. The tamper wrap covers the entirety of a first surface of the printed circuit board and at least a portion of a second surface opposite the first surface of the printed circuit board. Each of the side tabs covers at least a portion of one of the side walls of the printed circuit board and each of the corner flaps is folded around and covers a respective one of the corner edges of the printed circuit board. The printed circuit board may have a plurality of corner sentinels mounted adjacent to the corners of a surface thereof for protecting such corners.

An electronic device has a chassis, and a printed wiring board (PWB) having a hole. A fastener is installed in the hole thereby securing the PWB to the chassis. A pair of conductive traces is formed in the PWB. A cap, being an amount of conductive glue, covers a part of the fastener and fills an electrically insulating gap between the two traces, to thereby form a conductive path that connects the two traces. A sensing circuit is coupled to the traces, to detect a change in impedance of the path and signal a tamper event alert. Other embodiments are also described and claimed.

A security system for electronic circuits (e.g. electronic circuits contained within a secure POS terminal) is provided that is both more tamper resistant, and tamper responsive and less expensive than the prior art epoxy potting. This is achieved by inserting an electrical connector between a first and a second circuit board contained within a case of the POS terminal. The first and the second circuit boards are any type of circuit board known in the art, including both not limited to, rigid circuit boards, flexible circuit boards, printed circuit boards, etc. If the case is opened the connector no longer provides an electrical connection between the first and the second circuit boards, triggering a tamper detection circuit. In some embodiments of the invention, a flexible conductive film is wrapped around the circuit boards and the connector. If a tamperer attempts to penetrate the case of the POS terminal to disable the tamper detection circuit, the circuit on the flexible security film is interrupted, in turn triggering the tamper detection circuit. As a result, the secure POS terminal of the present invention overcomes the limitations of prior art potted terminals. By eliminating the potting process, in fact, the cost of manufacturing the terminal is reduced and there is no need for a special ventilation system. In addition, the circuitry within the terminal can be accessed for repair and maintenance purposes.

The invention provides transient printed circuit board devices, including active and passive devices that electrically and / or physically transform upon application of at least one internal and / or external stimulus.

A security wrap (20) for protecting an electronic component includes a substrate (22) having a first side and a second side opposite to each other. A security screen (26) is disposed over the first side of the substrate (22) and includes a pair of screen terminals (48) and a frangible and electrically conductive path (46) between the pair of screen terminals (48). A layer of adhesive (30) is over the first side of the substrate (22) and bonds the first side of the substrate (22) to the electronic component with the security screen (26) sandwiched there between.

A tamper protected printed circuit board assembly including a printed circuit board and a partially enveloping tamper wrap covering the entirety of the top surface of the printed circuit board and a first portion of the bottom surface of the printed circuit board, wherein a second portion of the bottom surface of the printed circuit board is not covered by the tamper wrap is provided. The printed circuit board includes two security trace layers each having two security traces thereon, preferably in a serpentine pattern. The tamper wrap and the security traces together cover and prevent tampering with the electronic circuitry of the printed circuit board.

A tamper-proof structure for protecting an electronic module, comprising a pattern of signal lines having a highly unpredictable layout, which is an approximation of a space-filling curve obtained by the replication of at least one elementary space element having an inscribed base curve inscribed therein. The base curve is adapted, by replication of the elementary space element, to generate an approximation of an at least two-dimensional space-filling curve, the replication being such that an end of the base curve in one elementary space element is connected to the end of the base curve in another, adjacent elementary space element of the replication.

A tamper respondent enclosure including (a) a circuit board; (b) an enclosure surrounding the circuit board; (c) a tamper respondent sensor having (i) a substrate with first and second sides; (ii) a first layer of conductive traces on the first side; (d) wherein the tamper respondent sensor is wrapped around the enclosure with at least one overlap region; and (e) wherein only at the at least one overlap region the tamper respondent sensor has a second layer of conductive traces on the second side. Preferably, the substrate is insulating and made of opaque PET, and the first layer is adjacent the enclosure.

A circuit board is provided in which tamper resistance is improved by making probing by third parties difficult, while solving problems associated with the current techniques and manufacturing costs. A signal line through which a confidential signal requiring tamper resistance flows and components 32 and 33 connected to the signal line 21 by the terminals thereof, are laid out in a component-containing layer 13 of a circuit board 10. Only a confidential signal having been encrypted through a predetermined component 31 is outputted to an observation point 34 provided on a surface of the circuit board 10. External observation and control of the confidential signal is performed by decoding a cipher provided by the component 31 to the signal which appears at the observation point 34.

A security wrap (20) for protecting an electronic component (16) includes a substrate (26) having a first side and a second side opposite to each other. A conductive path (22) is disposed over the first side of the substrate (26) and has first and second ends coupled to the electronic component (16), and a pattern selected from a plurality of predetermined patterns. A layer of adhesive (28) is over the first side of the substrate (26) and bonds the first side of the substrate (26) to the electronic component (16) with the conductive path (22) sandwiched there between.

A multilayer circuit board of a wireless terminal, a circuit assembly comprising the circuit board and a wireless terminal comprising the circuit assembly are provided. The wireless terminal is of a type which utilizes a UICC. The multilayer circuit board is configured to accommodate a UICC encapsulated within one or more interior layers of the multilayer circuit board, for example as a semiconductor die. The multilayer circuit board is further configured to accommodate one or more additional components integral to functionality of the wireless terminal, optionally also embedded within the circuit board. Integration of components into the interior layers may facilitate theft deterrence and / or tamper resistance. A physical programming interface to the encapsulated UICC may be rendered inaccessible after initial programming.

A method for embedding tamper proof layers and discrete components into a printed circuit board stack-up is disclosed. According to this method, a plating mask is applied on a base substrate to cover partially one of its faces. Conductive ink is then spread on this face so as to fill the gap formed by the plating mask. To obtain a uniform distribution of the conductive ink and then gel it, the conductive ink is preferably heated. A dielectric layer is applied on the conductive ink layer and the polymerization process is ended to obtain a strong adhesion between these two layers. In a preferred embodiment, conductive tracks are simultaneously designed on the other face of the base substrate to reduce thermo-mechanical strains and deformations.