257results about "Circuit security details" patented technology

A tamper respondent module includes a basecard adapted to be inserted into a slot in a rack enclosure comprising at least one guide edge, at least one electrical coupler, a surface and at least one electronic component that contains information in an electronic format. In one example, an outer cover is coupled to the basecard and includes at least five sides. The outer cover is arranged in a covering relationship over the at least one electronic component. In another example, an anti-tamper apparatus is disposed between the outer cover and the surface. In another example, an anti-tamper circuit is electrically coupled to the at least one electronic component. In another example, a thermal frame is thermally coupled to the at least one electronic component.

The invention is based on use of a heat-activated adhesive for manufacturing of intelligent devices comprising printed conductive electronics on a flexible substrate, where the adhesive is an anisotropic electrically conductive adhesive and is applied to the substrate as a thin film which can be used for electrical connections and for providing mechanical stability to the printed conductive electronics.

A tamper-proof cap adapted to be mounted on a large assembly for shielding a selected area of the large assembly is disclosed. The tamper-proof cap comprises a laminate stack-up structure wherein at least one open chamber is formed. The stack-up structure comprises at least two layers wherein tamper-proof layers are formed on top of the open chamber. A plurality of vias are disposed around the open chamber, forming with said tamper proof layers a tamper-proof structure around said open chamber. The vias are adapted for connecting the tamper-proof layers to the large assembly when the tamper-proof cap is mounted. In a preferred embodiment, the tamper-proof cap further comprises a shielding layer on top of the tamper-proof layer that are preferably done using conductive ink.

A method and device for data security including a printed circuit board and an integrated circuit each having a conductive trace layer shielded by a electrical shield layer. Tampering with either side of the device causes disturbance of a current flowing through a conductive trace layer used as an electrical shield. This triggers a security circuit to erase the data stored in the integrated circuit and stop data flow between the printed circuit board and the integrated circuit.

The invention provides transient devices, including active and passive devices that physically, chemically and/or electrically transform upon application of at least one internal and/or external stimulus. Incorporation of degradable device components, degradable substrates and/or degradable encapsulating materials each having a programmable, controllable and/or selectable degradation rate provides a means of transforming the device. In some embodiments, for example, transient devices of the invention combine degradable high performance single crystalline inorganic materials with selectively removable substrates and/or encapsulants.

A protective, anti-tamper coating and methods of coating creation and application are provided. The coating may include an elastomeric layer to allow for strippability/removal. The coating may also include a “smart layer” for tamper detection, imaging prevention, and tamper prevention or underlying device de-activation/alteration upon tamper detection. The coating may also include one or more ground planes around the smart layer and one or more frangible layers designed to interrupt or alter smart layer function in the event of a tamper attempt.

An electronic device has a chassis, and a printed wiring board (PWB) having a hole. A fastener is installed in the hole thereby securing the PWB to the chassis. A pair of conductive traces is formed in the PWB. A cap, being an amount of conductive glue, covers a part of the fastener and fills an electrically insulating gap between the two traces, to thereby form a conductive path that connects the two traces. A sensing circuit is coupled to the traces, to detect a change in impedance of the path and signal a tamper event alert. Other embodiments are also described and claimed.

A security system for electronic circuits (e.g. electronic circuits contained within a secure POS terminal) is provided that is both more tamper resistant, and tamper responsive and less expensive than the prior art epoxy potting. This is achieved by inserting an electrical connector between a first and a second circuit board contained within a case of the POS terminal. The first and the second circuit boards are any type of circuit board known in the art, including both not limited to, rigid circuit boards, flexible circuit boards, printed circuit boards, etc. If the case is opened the connector no longer provides an electrical connection between the first and the second circuit boards, triggering a tamper detection circuit. In some embodiments of the invention, a flexible conductive film is wrapped around the circuit boards and the connector. If a tamperer attempts to penetrate the case of the POS terminal to disable the tamper detection circuit, the circuit on the flexible security film is interrupted, in turn triggering the tamper detection circuit. As a result, the secure POS terminal of the present invention overcomes the limitations of prior art potted terminals. By eliminating the potting process, in fact, the cost of manufacturing the terminal is reduced and there is no need for a special ventilation system. In addition, the circuitry within the terminal can be accessed for repair and maintenance purposes.

The invention provides transient printed circuit board devices, including active and passive devices that electrically and/or physically transform upon application of at least one internal and/or external stimulus.

A security wrap (20) for protecting an electronic component includes a substrate (22) having a first side and a second side opposite to each other. A security screen (26) is disposed over the first side of the substrate (22) and includes a pair of screen terminals (48) and a frangible and electrically conductive path (46) between the pair of screen terminals (48). A layer of adhesive (30) is over the first side of the substrate (22) and bonds the first side of the substrate (22) to the electronic component with the security screen (26) sandwiched there between.

A tamper protected printed circuit board assembly including a printed circuit board and a partially enveloping tamper wrap covering the entirety of the top surface of the printed circuit board and a first portion of the bottom surface of the printed circuit board, wherein a second portion of the bottom surface of the printed circuit board is not covered by the tamper wrap is provided. The printed circuit board includes two security trace layers each having two security traces thereon, preferably in a serpentine pattern. The tamper wrap and the security traces together cover and prevent tampering with the electronic circuitry of the printed circuit board.

A tamper-proof structure for protecting an electronic module, comprising a pattern of signal lines having a highly unpredictable layout, which is an approximation of a space-filling curve obtained by the replication of at least one elementary space element having an inscribed base curve inscribed therein. The base curve is adapted, by replication of the elementary space element, to generate an approximation of an at least two-dimensional space-filling curve, the replication being such that an end of the base curve in one elementary space element is connected to the end of the base curve in another, adjacent elementary space element of the replication.

An electronic device is protected from unauthorized access by use of a security wrap having a security screen connected to an alarm circuit of the electronic device. The security screen has a pair of screen terminals interconnected by a conductor. The conductor is formed on a substrate. The substrate is arranged such that attempts to remove the security wrap will result in the substrate being torn and the conductor being damaged or broken whereby the resistance of the conductive path formed by the conductor changes to indicate an alarm condition.

A tamper respondent enclosure including (a) a circuit board; (b) an enclosure surrounding the circuit board; (c) a tamper respondent sensor having (i) a substrate with first and second sides; (ii) a first layer of conductive traces on the first side; (d) wherein the tamper respondent sensor is wrapped around the enclosure with at least one overlap region; and (e) wherein only at the at least one overlap region the tamper respondent sensor has a second layer of conductive traces on the second side. Preferably, the substrate is insulating and made of opaque PET, and the first layer is adjacent the enclosure.

A circuit board is provided in which tamper resistance is improved by making probing by third parties difficult, while solving problems associated with the current techniques and manufacturing costs. A signal line through which a confidential signal requiring tamper resistance flows and components 32 and 33 connected to the signal line 21 by the terminals thereof, are laid out in a component-containing layer 13 of a circuit board 10. Only a confidential signal having been encrypted through a predetermined component 31 is outputted to an observation point 34 provided on a surface of the circuit board 10. External observation and control of the confidential signal is performed by decoding a cipher provided by the component 31 to the signal which appears at the observation point 34.

A multilayer circuit board of a wireless terminal, a circuit assembly comprising the circuit board and a wireless terminal comprising the circuit assembly are provided. The wireless terminal is of a type which utilizes a UICC. The multilayer circuit board is configured to accommodate a UICC encapsulated within one or more interior layers of the multilayer circuit board, for example as a semiconductor die. The multilayer circuit board is further configured to accommodate one or more additional components integral to functionality of the wireless terminal, optionally also embedded within the circuit board. Integration of components into the interior layers may facilitate theft deterrence and/or tamper resistance. A physical programming interface to the encapsulated UICC may be rendered inaccessible after initial programming.

A method for embedding tamper proof layers and discrete components into a printed circuit board stack-up is disclosed. According to this method, a plating mask is applied on a base substrate to cover partially one of its faces. Conductive ink is then spread on this face so as to fill the gap formed by the plating mask. To obtain a uniform distribution of the conductive ink and then gel it, the conductive ink is preferably heated. A dielectric layer is applied on the conductive ink layer and the polymerization process is ended to obtain a strong adhesion between these two layers. In a preferred embodiment, conductive tracks are simultaneously designed on the other face of the base substrate to reduce thermo-mechanical strains and deformations.